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In no industry has the impact of the events of September 11, 2001
("9/11") been felt more strongly than in the communications industry. After
9/11, as the American people demanded a greater sense of security,
Congress and the executive branch agencies reacted with new laws, new
regulations, and new practices designed to protect our nation's critical
communications infrastructure and enhance the ability of law enforcement
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and intelligence agencies to investigate those who would do us harm.
The U.S. communications industry has long been a partner of the
government in its efforts to carry out appropriate governmental functions,
so long as communications providers could do so consistent with their
responsibilities to customers and to shareholders. That partnership, based
upon rules developed over decades, has been strained by the vast changes
since 9/11. In the few years since the attacks of that day, the industry has
had to digest innumerable new and untested obligations. At the same time,
the government has struggled to develop procedures for addressing the
legitimate privacy and other concerns implicated by its new powers. The
reach of these changes-from new authorities to demand customer
information, to more stringent scrutiny of proposed mergers-has affected
nearly every aspect of a communications provider's daily work. The review
that follows attempts to look across the regulatory environment at the scope
of these changes to identify the issues that have arisen for both the
government and industry participants.
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY
Through the Patriot Act' and other post-9/11 legislation, Congress
substantially expanded the government's powers to conduct electronic
surveillance and obtain information about users of communications
services. All providers of communications services are receiving requests
for assistance, including demands for information about their customers,
that are far greater in number and scope than in the past. These changes
present burdens as well as questions about the standards that law
enforcement agencies must meet in order to demand assistance or
information, and about the scope of the information that law enforcement
may obtain. And these questions in turn leave communications providers
open to possible liability and the risk of harm to their relationships with
their customers.
A. Changes to the Surveillance Statutes
Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
("Title 111")2 grants the government authority to intercept the content of
telephone or electronic communications only in narrowly defined
circumstances. The government's right to obtain addressing and other
noncontent information relating to communications subject to Title III is
1. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified at scattered sections U.S.C.) ("Patriot Act").
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (Supp. 2002).
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regulated by the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices chapter of Title
18 ("Pen/Trap Statute"). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
("ECPA") 4 governs disclosure of stored electronic communications.
5
Finally, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA")6
governs surveillance for foreign intelligence-gathering purposes.
The Patriot Act and other post-9/l1 legislation expanded the
government's surveillance powers through amendments to each of these
statutes. Those amendments (1) expand the scope of the surveillance
statutes to reach new communications providers, (2) enlarge the statutes'
coverage to include new surveillance targets, (3) lower the threshold that
the government must meet in order to engage in domestic and foreign
intelligence surveillance, (4) and allow communications providers to
submit voluntarily to government surveillance in limited situations. We
discuss each of these developments in turn.
1. Application to New Providers
Although the surveillance statutes on their face encompass nearly all
forms of wire and electronic communications,7 before the Patriot Act some
cable Internet providers argued that they were barred by the Cable
Communications Policy Act ("Cable Act") 8 from cooperating with law
3. Id. §§ 3121-27. A traditional pen register device is attached to a copper telephone
line and records the outgoing telephone numbers "dialed or otherwise transmitted" by the
target. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000). Similarly, a trap and trace device records the telephone
numbers of calls received by the target. Id. § 3127(4). Although traditional pen registers and
trap and trace devices are used only for telephone calls, they have analogues with respect to
Internet communications. A device that reads the header information of emails or the
routing information of other computer-to-computer communications is referred to as a
pen/trap device. COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS at IV.C (July 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/s&smanual2002.htm [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL]. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-
(4) (Supp. 2002) (incorporating such devices into the statutory definitions of "pen register"
and "trap and trace device"). We use the term "pen/trap device" to refer to all three types of
devices.
4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (Supp. 2002).
5. Communications that are in "electronic storage" at an "electronic communication
service" or held by a "remote computing service" are subject to the protections of ECPA.
Id. § 2702(a). Such communications include stored email, computer data, and electronic
images.
6. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (Supp. 2002).
7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. 2002) (defining "wire communications" under
Title III to include "any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities
for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection
between the point of origin and the point of reception"). Title III contains a similarly broad
definition of electronic communications. See id. § 2510(12).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
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enforcement requests for surveillance assistance. 9 In its original form, the
Cable Act precluded cable providers from giving the government
"personally identifiable information" about cable subscribers except after
notice to the subscriber and an opportunity for an in-court adversarial
hearing. ° After 9/11, the Cable Act was amended to clarify that cable
providers are subject to the surveillance statutes.1" In addition to opening
cable television and cable Internet providers to surveillance requests, this
amendment also brings other communications companies within the scope
of the surveillance statutes, including Web TV providers and any other
provider that structures its business in such a way as to qualify as a "cable
operator" under Title VI of the Communications Act.' 2
2. New Classes of Surveillance Targets and Increased Access to
Information
Congress coupled its application of the surveillance statutes to new
communications providers with an expansion of the substantive reach of
those statutes. Recent amendments have expanded the government's power
under certain statutory provisions to obtain documents and specific details
about a surveillance target's communications. Other statutory changes
permit the government to pursue new classes of surveillance targets for
both foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement purposes.
The post-9/11 amendments clarify that the Pen/Trap Statute applies to
a wide range of communications technologies, not just telephone
communications. 3 They confirm that the government may intercept
9. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 3, at III.G.3 (noting that "[s]ome cable companies
asserted that the stringent disclosure restrictions of the Cable Act governed not only their
provision of traditional cable programming services, but also their provision of Internet and
telephone services").
10. 47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (2000).
11. Patriot Act § 211, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (Supp. 2002). Now the Cable Act's restrictions
apply only to government requests for information about the cable television programming a
customer purchases, such as "pay-per-view" movies. See id. § 551(c)(2) (providing that a
cable provider may release personally identifiable information about a subscriber "if the
disclosure is... to a government entity as authorized under chapters 119 [Title III], 121
[ECPA], or 206 [Pen/Trap Statute] of Title 18, except that such disclosure shall not include
records revealing cable subscriber selection of video programming from a cable operator").
12. Id. § 522(5) (defining "cable operator").
13. See Patriot Act § 216, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121(c), 3123, 3124, 3127 (Supp. 2002). Even
before the Patriot Act, the government sometimes used the Pen/Trap Statute to obtain
information about communications on computer networks, but no federal district or
appellate court had explicitly ruled on the propriety of this practice. See COMPUTER CRIME
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION (CCIPS), FIELD GUIDANCE ON NEW AUTHORITIES
THAT RELATE TO COMPUTER CRIME AND ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE ENACTED IN THE USA
PATRIOT ACT OF 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
PatriotAct.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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addressing information in Internet communications under the same
standard that applies to collection of routing information for traditional
phone calls. 14 The government now may install software in addition to
mechanical pen/trap devices.' 5 This permits the government to use "packet
sniffer" programs that extract information about a surveillance target's
Internet communications. 16
The amount of basic subscriber information obtainable through an
administrative subpoena under ECPA has expanded. 7 Under prior law, the
government could obtain a surveillance target's name, address, telephone
billing records, telephone number, and length and type of service.' 8 Now it
may obtain as well the means and source of payment that a surveillance
target uses to pay for an account, including the target's credit card or bank
account number. 19 It also may obtain records of the target's session times
and durations20 and any network address temporarily assigned to the
target.z1 Similarly, under FISA, the government now may require any
person or company to produce "any tangible thing[]," including books,
papers, or documents,2 2 and is no longer limited to business records held by
a small class of companies.23
New categories of surveillance targets also have been added. Title III
always has required the government to demonstrate probable cause to
believe an individual "is committing, has committed, or is about to
14. The Pen/Trap Statute originally permitted the government to obtain only "electronic
or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted" on a
telephone line or "incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating
number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was
transmitted." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (2000). The government now may obtain "dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling information" so long as such information does not include
the contents of the communication. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (Supp. 2002). In addition,
references in the Pen/Trap Statute to a "line" were amended to state "line or other facility."
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123-24 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
15. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (Supp. 2002). The Pen/Trap Statute initially defined a
pen register or a trap and trace device simply as "a device." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (2000).
Now the statutory definition includes "a device or process." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (Supp.
2002).
16. See discussion of packet sniffer programs infra Part I.B.2.
17. See Patriot Act § 210, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (Supp. 2002).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C) (2000).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)(F) (Supp. 2002).
20. Id. § 2703(c)(2)(C).
21. Id. § 2703(c)(2)(E).
22. Patriot Act § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (Supp. 2002).
23. Under the prior version of this section, the government was entitled to obtain
"records" only from "a common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage
facility, or vehicle rental facility." 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a), (b)(2), (d)(1) (2000).
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commit" one of the predicate felony offenses listed in the statute. 4 Since
9/11, Congress has added many new crimes to the list of predicate offenses,
including crimes related to terrorism, 25 computer fraud, 26 and biological
weapons.27 And while FISA still requires the government-when it seeks
to obtain "foreign intelligence information" through electronic surveillance
or a physical search-to show probable cause to believe that the target of
surveillance is a "foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,, 28 this
phrase now includes so-called lone wolf terrorists. 29 Now, any non-U.S.
person who participates in activities related to international terrorism is
deemed to be an "agent of a foreign power" under FISA.3°
3. Lower Thresholds for Authorization
Amendments to the surveillance statutes also make it easier for the
government to obtain information. Congress has lowered many of the
standards that the government must satisfy in order to engage in domestic
or foreign intelligence surveillance.
The government now has a reduced burden when seeking to obtain
pen/trap orders under FISA.31 Law enforcement may obtain an order for a
pen/trap device in any investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities and may obtain information
about the communications of even U.S. citizens so long as the investigation
is not conducted solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the
First Amendment.32
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (requiring the government to relate its surveillance
request to one of the crimes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516).
25. Patriot Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. 2002). These offenses include crimes
of violence committed against Americans overseas, id. § 2332, multinational terrorism, id.
§ 2332b, and providing material support to a terrorist, id. § 2339A.
26. Section 202 of the Patriot Act added felony violations of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, to the list of predicate offenses. Patriot Act § 202, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516(1)(c) (Supp. 2002).
27. These offenses were added in the recently passed Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6907, 118 Stat. 3638, 3774
(2004) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)) ("Intelligence Reform Act").
28. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
29. Intelligence Reform Act § 6001 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (Supp. 2002)).
See generally ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION
ACT OF 2004: "LONE WOLF" AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT (Cong. Research Serv., Report for Congress, 2004), at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/
RS2201 1.pdf (discussing implications of amendment).
30. Intelligence Reform Act § 6001 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C)).
31. Patriot Act § 214, 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (Supp. 2002).
32. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) (Supp. 2002); id. § 1842(c)(2) (requiring applications for
pen/trap orders to contain "a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be
obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or is
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
Two other provisions also have been changed to this lower standard.
Under ECPA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") may, simply by
sending a "national security letter" to a communications provider,33 compel
disclosure of a surveillance target's transactional records and personally
identifiable information. 34 The newly amended statute requires the FBI to
certify only that the requested information is relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities and that no U.S. person has been targeted solely on
the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment.35 And under FISA
the government may obtain physical access to business records by making
the same showing. 36
The government now has a lower threshold to meet when it seeks to
obtain the content of a surveillance target's voicemail as well. Previously,
access to electronically stored wire communications, including voicemail,
fell under Title 111,37 which required a showing that, among other facts,
normal investigative procedures had been tried and had failed or appeared
to be too dangerous.38 Under the recent amendments, access to voicemail
relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not
conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution"). The monitored communications no longer must be of an individual thought
to be engaged in such activities, nor must the activities potentially violate U.S. or other
criminal laws. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2)-(3) (2000).
33. Patriot Act § 505, 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (Supp. 2002).
34. Those records include a customer's "electronic communication transactional
records," 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a) (Supp. 2002), and his or her "name, address, length of
service, and local and long distance toll billing records," id. § 2709(b)(1).
35. Id. § 2709(b)(1). The FBI no longer must certify that it has reason to believe either
that the information sought pertains to a person or entity that is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power or that communications facilities registered in the name of that person or
entity have been used to communicate with someone engaged in international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities. Compare id. with 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(l)-(2) (2000). We
discuss below the holding of a federal court in New York that this provision is
unconstitutional. See infra Part I.B.2.
36. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (Supp. 2002); see also id. § 1861(a)(2)(B), (b)(2). Prior to
the amendment, the government was entitled to access business records upon a showing of
specific facts giving it reason to believe that the records sought pertained to a person who
was a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2) (2000).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000). The definition of wire communications included "any
electronic storage of such communication." Id.
38. See id. § 2518(3)-(5) (providing that the government may intercept the contents of a
communication only after showing, in an application for a court order, that (1) "normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely
to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous"; (2) there is probable cause to believe that that the
communication facility subject to surveillance is being used in a crime or that the facility is
"leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by" the target of the surveillance; and
(3) the surveillance will be conducted in a way that minimizes the interception of
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may be obtained pursuant to the less demanding standards of ECPA,39
through a traditional search warrant supported by a showing of probable
cause.4" Similarly, under FISA, the collection of foreign intelligence
information now need be merely "a significant purpose" and not "the
purpose" of requested surveillance.4
The surveillance statutes now contain streamlined procedures
facilitating the government's surveillance efforts. The government is
entitled to nationwide service of court orders and search warrants issued
pursuant to ECPA42  and the Pen/Trap Statute.4 3  Under the new
amendments, a federal court with jurisdiction over the crime being
investigated has authority to issue orders and search warrants that are valid
anywhere within the United States." Similarly, recognizing that likely
targets of investigations may frequently change communications providers
to avoid surveillance, Congress amended FISA and the Pen/Trap Statute to
permit the issuance of generic surveillance orders that can be served on any
third party needed to assist with surveillance.4"
Finally, the government now has additional means of persuading
communications that do not provide evidence of a crime).
39. Section 209 of the Patriot Act removed voicemail from Title In and made it subject
to ECPA instead. See Patriot Act § 209, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2703 (Supp. 2002).
40. Patriot Act § 209, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (Supp. 2002). Investigators face an even
lower burden when obtaining voicemail that an intended recipient already has opened. DOJ
MANUAL, supra note 3, at III.D.4.
41. Patriot Act § 218 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B)). A
specially convened appeals court recently held that the government probably had such
power even before the Patriot Act amended the statute. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,
723 (F.I.S. Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting that "it is quite puzzling that the Justice Department, at
some point during the 1980s, began to read the statute as limiting the Department's ability to
obtain FISA orders if it intended to prosecute the targeted agents .... It does not seem that
FISA, at least as originally enacted, even contemplated that the FISA court would inquire
into the government's purpose in seeking foreign intelligence information.").
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(l)(A), (c)(1)(A) (Supp. 2002) (providing that search
warrants or court orders for content and customer records can be issued by any court "with
jurisdiction over the offense under investigation").
43. Id. § 3123(a)(1). See also id. § 3127(2). Previously, the reach of such court orders
and search warrants was limited by the jurisdiction of the court issuing them. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000) (Pen/Trap Statute); id. § 2703(a), (b), (c)(1)(B) (ECPA).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (Supp. 2002); id. § 3122(a); id. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A),
(c)(1)(A).
45. See Patriot Act § 206 (amending FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2000)); id.
§ 216 (amending the Pen/Trap Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000)). Under the prior regime,
the government was required to obtain a new order whenever a surveillance target changed
phone companies. FISA required the government to specify the location of the surveillance
and provided only for orders directing a "specified" communications carrier to assist with a
surveillance request. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B) (2000). Similarly, the
applicable section of the Pen/Trap Statute did not provide for roving surveillance. See 18
U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
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communications providers to comply with surveillance requests. The
surveillance statutes contain "safe harbors" designed to protect carriers that
comply with requests. These provisions generally absolve carriers of
liability to the extent that they act in "good faith reliance on" an
authorization such as a search warrant or court order.46 They also provide,
for example, that "[n]o cause of action shall lie in any court against any
provider of wire or electronic communication service, its officers,
employees, agents, or other specified persons for providing information,
facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order,
warrant, subpoena, statutory authorization, or certification under this
chapter."47  Although these provisions have always existed, recent
amendments have expanded their scope to reach new situations. ECPA's
safe harbor provision now applies to a provider's actions in complying with
government evidence-preservation requests.48 Similarly, the Pen/Trap
Statute now conveys statutory immunity when a provider complies with a
pen/trap "order," rather than the express "terms of' such an order.49
4. Expanded Voluntary Disclosure
Amendments to the surveillance statutes have added to the
circumstances in which communications providers may voluntarily disclose
information to law enforcement. One of these is the "computer trespasser"
exception.5° Under this provision, victims of computer attacks may
authorize the government to intercept the wire or electronic
communications of a computer trespasser that are sent to, through, or from
46. "A good faith reliance on ... a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a
legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization" is a complete defense to an ECPA
violation or "any civil or criminal action brought under... any other law." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2707(e) (Supp. 2002). The other surveillance statutes contain similar provisions. See, e.g.,
id. § 2520(d)(1) (Title III); id. § 3124(e) (Pen/Trap Statute).
47. Id. § 2703(e). Nearly identical provisions appear in the other surveillance statutes.
See, e.g., id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (Title III); id. § 3124(d) (Pen/Trap Statute).
48. Id. § 2707(e)(1) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(0, which sets out a procedure
whereby the government can direct a provider to preserve evidence until a court order can
be obtained).
49. Id. § 3124(d) (providing that "[n]o cause of action shall lie in any court against any
provider of a wire or electronic communication service, its officers, employees, agents, or
other specified persons for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with
a court order under this chapter or request pursuant to section 3125 of this title").
50. A "computer trespasser" is defined as "a person who accesses a protected computer
without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any
communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2 ])(A) (Supp. 2002). Section 217 of the Patriot Act amended Title III to provide for
this new exception. See Patriot Act § 217 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-11 (2000)).
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the victim's computer.5 Another new voluntary disclosure exception
permits communications providers to divulge customer records to the
government (or any other entity) when necessary to protect the rights or
property of the provider.52 Yet another permits communications providers
to disclose customer records or the contents of a communication to any
governmental entity in emergency situations when the provider reasonably
believes that there is an immediate danger of death or serious physical
injury if the information is not disclosed. " Through these exceptions, a
communications provider may offer information to the government even in
the absence of any other statutory authorization.
B. Effects on Communications Providers
These enhancements to the government's surveillance authority
present a variety of challenges and risks for communications providers.
Many of the amendments introduce additional complications into already
complex statutes, making it more difficult for providers to discern what
their obligations are. And missteps may harm providers' reputations and
could lead to civil damages and even other sanctions.
1. Practical Consequences of the Government's Enhanced
Surveillance Powers
Because the surveillance statutes now clearly apply to cable
providers,5 4 many cable television, cable Internet, and other cable system-
based communications providers are facing surveillance requests for the
first time. And providers that have previously dealt with such requests are
now facing government demands for assistance that are more frequent and
51. Id. § 2511(2)(i). See also R.J. Cinquegrana and Richard M. Harper II, The USA
PATRIOT Act: Effects on American Employers and Businesses, 46 BOSTON BAR J., May-
June 2002, at 12 [hereinafter BOSTON BAR JOURNAL].
52. See id. § 2702(c)(3) (ECPA). Although this is a new voluntary exception,
communications providers already had authority to disclose the contents of a
communication if necessary to protect the rights or property of the provider. Id.
§ 2702(b)(5).
53. Section 212 of the Patriot Act amended section 2702 of ECPA to permit disclosure
of certain communications in emergency situations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6)(C) (Supp.
2001). Section 2702 was later amended by the Homeland Security Act; it now permits a
communications provider to disclose the content of a communication "if the provider, in
good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury
to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the
emergency." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) (Supp. 2002). Similarly, customer records may be
disclosed under ECPA "if the provider reasonably believes that an emergency involving
immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person justifies disclosure of the
information." Id. § 2702(c)(4).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2) (Supp. 2002).
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broader in scope than ever before. 55
The increased number and scope of surveillance requests has
necessitated an increase in the capacity and capability of communications
networks. This raises the contentious question of who pays for such
network modifications.5 6 Similarly, aiding the government with individual
surveillance requests is expensive. A report by the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts states that the average
cost of a Title IH wiretap in 2003 was $71,625. 57 Although companies can
seek reimbursement of the amounts expended in assisting the
government, 58 the process is administratively burdensome and the amount
paid as compensation often does not capture the full costs of assisting with
wiretaps and other types of surveillance.59 Government surveillance
requests issued under FISA may be handled only by employees who have
successfully undergone a background check by the FBI and who carry a
55. In 2003, the FISA court approved 1724 applications for electronic surveillance
and/or physical searches, a 40 percent increase over the preceding year. Compare Letter
from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham, Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/2003_report.pdf with Letter from John Ashcroft,
Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/
2002rept.pdf [hereinafter 2002 FISA Report] (stating that the FISA court approved 1228
applications). In 2002, the FISA court approved 1228 applications for electronic
surveillance and/or physical searches, a 31 percent increase over 2001. Compare 2002 FISA
Report with Letter to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, from John
Ashcroft, Attorney General (Apr. 29, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/200lrept.html (stating that the FISA court granted 934 applications in 2001). The
number of non-FISA applications for federal wiretap orders rose 16 percent from 2002 to
2003. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING
THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL, OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, at 5 (Apr. 2004),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap03/2003WireTap.pdf [hereinafter 2003
WIRETAP REPORT]. The year before, the number of federal wiretap authorizations increased
by 2 percent. Id. at 32, tbl. 7. These non-FISA wiretap reports do not contain information
about other methods of surveillance, such as physical searches or installations of pen/trap
devices.
56. See infra Part II.B.5 for a discussion of this issue.
57. 2003 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 55, at 11.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (Supp. 2002) (Title III); id. § 3124(c) (Pen/Trap Statute); id.
§ 2706(a) (ECPA).
59. See The Comm. Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Servs., Comments of CTIA-The Wireless Association, ET Dkt. No. 04-295, at 18-21 (Nov.
8, 2004), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id_
document=6516793514 (asserting to the FCC that "[tihe government would have the
Commission reduce the reimbursement obligation to a mere line charge, as if technical
assistance simply involved activating another phone" and explaining that carriers are
generally paid a flat rate that may not take into consideration all of the rules that impose
financial burdens on communications providers).
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current National Security Clearance. 6° The increase in surveillance requests
has, therefore, required companies to hire more security-cleared employees.
Because the amendments to the surveillance statutes are far-reaching
and complicated, they also require companies to revise their procedures for
responding to surveillance requests. And the government's increased power
to compel disclosure of information has also required companies to modify
their privacy policies.6' This is especially true of providers offering
services over cable, because the Cable Act amendments reduced the level
of privacy expected by cable subscribers. Policy changes are not likely to
be popular with customers, but the serious consequences of violating
established privacy policies make them necessary. 62
2. Considerations When Responding to Government Surveillance
Requests
In responding to government surveillance requests, companies try to
be responsible corporate citizens. But the challenges they face-in
customer concern and otherwise-are substantial. In particular, it is often
difficult for providers to distinguish between content and noncontent
information in the context of Internet communications, making it hard for
them to determine how much information they must disclose. The safe
harbor provisions in the surveillance statutes protect carriers from liability
when they offer the government information beyond that which is lawfully
called for, if they do so "in accordance with" or in "good faith reliance on"
a court order or other type of authorization. 63 But if an order does not
60. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 2002); see also A. Michael Froomkin, It Came
from Planet Clipper: The Battle over Cryptographic Key "Escrow ", 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
15, 41 (1996) (explaining that "federal law requires that telephone companies have someone
on their staff with a SECRET clearance to receive and comply with FISA court-ordered
wiretaps" (emphasis in original)).
61. See, e.g., Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 494 n.118 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting
that compliance with the amended national security letter provision is problematic for some
communications providers because they have "contractually obligated themselves to protect
the anonymity of their subscribers").
62. For example, a number of angry JetBlue customers filed a lawsuit after learning that
the airline breached its own privacy policy by giving five million passenger itineraries to a
defense contractor for use in developing passenger profiles used to identify possible
terrorism suspects. Annie I. Anton et al., Inside JetBlue's Privacy Policy Violations, IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY, Nov.-Dec. 2004, available at http://www4.ncsu.edu/~qhe2/
publications/jetblue ieee-sp04.pdf.
63. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3124(d) (Supp. 2002) (providing that "[n]o cause of action
shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic communication
service... for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with a court
order"); id. § 2707(e) (immunizing providers who act in "good faith reliance on... a court
warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory
authorization").
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clearly reach particular information, the communication provider's good
faith must be reasonable under the circumstances. 64 There also are other
consequences that carriers cannot protect themselves against through
reliance on the safe harbor provisions alone. Even futile lawsuits premised
on a provider's violation of the surveillance statutes or its own privacy
policy are costly and inconvenient to defend. And a provider viewed as not
protecting customer privacy also will suffer damage to its reputation and
customer relationships.
Although the meaning of "content" is usually obvious with respect to
conventional telephone conversations, its meaning is not clear in the
context of human-to-computer communications. When surfing the Internet,
a person "sends commands to his computer directing it to send commands
to the host computer, asking the host to send back packets of data that will
be assembled by his computer into a web page."' 65 Such a command can be
viewed in two different ways: "either the command is the 'content' of the
communication between the user and his computer or it is merely
'addressing information' that the user entered into his computer to tell the
computer where it should go and what it should do, much like [a] pen
register ... ."66 Because the recent amendments to the surveillance statutes
do not shed light on which view is correct, communications providers
responding to government requests are left to answer this question
themselves.
Of course, ambiguities regarding what constitutes "content" are not
new. Even ordinary digits dialed after a phone call has been connected can
convey content.67 When a target calls an automated banking system, the
passwords and account numbers entered can be considered content.68
Similarly, digits dialed into alphanumeric pagers often convey substantive
messages to the recipient.69 Citing such examples, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has noted that it is still an
open question whether the government must seek a Title III warrant to
obtain such information.7°
64. See infra note 81.
65. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw.U. L. REV. 607, 646 (2003) [hereinafter Big Brother] (citations
omitted).
66. Id.
67. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA), 227 F.3d 450 462 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Such digits are called "post-cut-through dialed digits." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. For example, when leaving an urgent message for a pager customer, a caller
might enter the digits 911.
70. See id.
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These issues are arising more frequently since 9/11. As discussed, the
Patriot Act clarified that the Pen/Trap Statute applies to Internet
communications. The government now may obtain "dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information" so long as such information does not
include the contents of the communication. 71 But Congress did not define
what these terms mean in the context of Internet communications. 72 Critics
contend that the websites a surveillance target visits might be viewed as
falling within the scope of "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information," but they argue that such information constitutes "content"
because the websites a person visits inevitably reveal something about the
substance of the communication.
73
Even if providing a list of the domain names that a target visits does
not implicate content, a question arises as to how far down in a website's
URL the government is entitled to look. For example, a visit to
www.target.com might not reveal much, but a visit to
www.aclu.org/contribute/contribute.cfm might show that the target made a
contribution to the American Civil Liberties Union, and a visit to
http://shopping.yahoo.com/p:Communist%20Manifesto: 1979236207 could
reveal that the target purchased a copy of the Communist Manifesto online.
Another question is whether the government may collect the terms that a
target enters into a search engine.74
Some guidance on the distinction between "contents" and "address
information" can be found in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), which defines the
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (Supp. 2002).
72. In debates on the Patriot Act, Senator Leahy chastised the FBI and the Department
of Justice for failing to provide clear definitions of these terms, arguing that "[w]e should be
clear about the consequence of not providing definitions for these new terms in the pen/trap
device statutes ... We are leaving the courts with little or no guidance of what is covered by
'addressing' or 'routing."' 147 CONG. REC. S10990-02, S11000 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). ECPA presents similar difficulties. That statute provides that the
government need not have a search warrant to obtain "record[s] or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [a communications] service (not including the
contents of communications)." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (Supp. 2002). Like the Pen/Trap
statute, ECPA does not elaborate on what information about Internet communications falls
within this category.
73. Susan W. Dean, Government Surveillance of Internet Communications: Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Law under the Patriot Act, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
97, 105 (2003) [hereinafter Government Surveillance]. Similarly, such information might
qualify as "record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [a
communications] service (not including the contents of communications)" under ECPA. 18
U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) (Supp. 2002).
74. Center for Democracy and Technology, Anti-Terrorism Act Expands Government
Surveillance Authorities, Weakens Privacy Protection with No Clear Benefit to Security, at 2
(Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/010921 cdt.pdf.
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meaning of "contents" for purposes of Title Ill. 75 And several cases that
discuss the meaning of content with respect to traditional types of
communications also shed light on its meaning in the context of Internet
communications. 76 Nonetheless, these aids are helpful only to a limited
extent, and it remains unclear exactly what is meant by "dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information.""
Such ambiguity in the text of the statutes poses a potential problem
for communications providers seeking to balance the privacy of their
customers against law enforcement's demands for information. Some
warrants and court orders issued to communications providers do not
provide enough specificity about the types of information that the
government is seeking. For example, an ECPA order might request that the
provider turn over any "relevant routing information" or a pen/trap order
might request all "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information. 78
In some circumstances, therefore, the communications provider will be left
to decide for itself what information to hand over to the government.
A provider that discloses too much information in "good faith" should
not face civil or criminal liability under the surveillance statutes. 79 As
noted, the safe harbor provisions in those statutes protect communications
providers by immunizing them from liability when they act in "good faith
reliance on" a court order or other form of statutory authorization. 80 So
long as providers make reasonable, good-faith efforts to separate content
from other types of information, these provisions should be sufficient to
75. That section provides that "'contents', when used with respect to any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (Supp. 2002).
76. See, e.g., Hill v. MCI, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1195-96 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (holding
that "invoice/billing information and the names, addresses, and phone numbers of parties
[Plaintiff] called" are not "contents" under Title III or ECPA); Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d
277, 296 n.27 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that information about the identity of the caller, the
number called, and the date, time, and length of a phone call are not "contents" under Title
III). Very few cases discuss the meaning of content in the context of Internet
communications, and even they are not particularly instructive. See, e.g., Jessop-Morgan v.
America Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (providing that an
Internet service provider did not violate ECPA by revealing "basic identity information"
about an account holder because such information did not constitute "content").
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (Supp. 2002).
78. See, e.g., DOJ MANUAL, supra note 3, at app. B (sample ECPA order).
79. Courts can impose severe sanctions for violations of the surveillance statutes. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)-(c) (Supp. 2002) (providing for civil damages for Title III
violations); id. § 2511(1), (4) (providing for criminal penalties under Title III); id.
§ 2707(b)-(c) (providing for civil damages for ECPA violations).
80. See, e.g., id. § 2520(d)(1) (immunizing providers from Title III penalties if they
demonstrate a "good faith reliance on... a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a
legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization").
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protect them if they accidentally disclose too much information to the
government. It merits emphasis that a provider must act reasonably. A
provider's subjective good-faith belief that its actions are lawful is not
enough to immunize it from liability.8 '
Even when they apply, the safe harbor provisions cannot protect a
provider from the expense and nuisance of defending futile lawsuits
brought by customers who complain that the provider has violated the
surveillance statutes or its own privacy policy by disclosing the content of
communications without authorization. 82 And a company viewed as
careless with customer information will suffer harm to its reputation and
position in the marketplace. Thus, providers may wish to take steps beyond
the safe harbor provisions and seek to ensure that they are not disclosing
content to the government when law enforcement is entitled only to
addressing information.
Attempting to avoid these difficulties, a number of companies have
outsourced the difficult task of isolating noncontent information. When
faced with a pen/trap order for Internet routing information, some providers
are giving the government permission to install packet sniffers that are
specially designed to monitor Internet communications. 83 These devices
81. A court recently held that a provider's subjective good faith reliance on a search
warrant is not enough to entitle the provider to protection under ECPA's safe harbor
provision. Freedman v. America Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 647-48 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Rather, the provider must demonstrate that its reliance was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. Id.; see also Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1484 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
that, "[tlo be in good faith," law enforcement's reliance on a search warrant "must have
been objectively reasonable"). Similarly, a number of courts have held that subjective good
faith alone is not sufficient to immunize parties from liability under Title III. See, e.g.,
Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a telephone company is
entitled to protection only if it "can demonstrate (1) that [it] had a subjective good faith
belief that [it] acted legally pursuant to a court order; and (2) that this belief was
reasonable").
82. The safe harbor provisions in the surveillance statutes likely protect
communications providers from liability arising from violations of their privacy policies.
For example, ECPA provides that "[n]o cause of action shall lie in any court against any
provider.., for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms
of a court order, warrant, subpoena, statutory authorization, or certification under this
chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). It also provides that "[a]
good faith reliance on" certain types of lawful authorization "is a complete defense to any
civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law." Id. § 2707(e). These
provisions cannot, however, prevent customers from filing suits arguing that the safe
harbors should not apply because the provider did not act reasonably in complying with a
government surveillance request.
83. In two recent reports to Congress, the government said that it had installed packet
sniffers thirteen times in fiscal 2002 and 2003. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CARNIVORE/DCS 1000 REPORT TO CONGRESS, at I
(Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.epic.orglprivacy/camivore/2002_report.pdf (stating
that the FBI used packet sniffers on five occasions in fiscal year 2002); FEDERAL BUREAU OF
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"tap" a line of Internet traffic at a particular point in the network and
analyze each of the packets flowing through that location.84 When law
enforcement possesses a Title III order, a packet sniffer can be used to
intercept the full content of a target's Internet communications. 85 By
contrast, when the government is entitled only to pen/trap information, the
packet sniffer can be set to ignore content and monitor only the addressing
and routing information of the target's communications.8 6 The government
has employed different types of packet sniffers over the years. Originally, it
used a device called Carnivore, which the FBI had developed.87 More
recently, the government has instead used commercially available packet
sniffing products.88
There is a nascent debate about whether the use of packet sniffers is
constitutional.89 But for communications companies, the question whether
INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CARNIVOREIDCS- 1000 REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carmivore/
2003_report.pdf (stating that the FBI used packet sniffers on eight occasions in fiscal year
2003).
84. Big Brother, supra note 65, at 649.
85. Id. at 654, 656.
86. See Government Surveillance, supra note 73, at 111.
87. The FBI has stated that it used Carnivore about 25 times between 1998 and 2000.
Ted Bridas, Associated Press, FBI Stops Using Carnivore Wiretap Software (Jan. 19,
2005), available at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=
57702375.
88. See id.; see also Kevin Poulsen, FBI Retires Carnivore, THE REGISTER, Jan. 15,
2005, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01 /15/fbi-retires-camivore/.
89. See, e.g., Robert Berkowitz, Packet Sniffers and Privacy: Why the No Suspicion
Required Standard in the USA PATRIOT Act is Unconstitutional, 7 Comp. L. Rev. & Tech.
J. 1, 3 (2002) [hereinafter Packet Sniffers]. Similarly, one court and some commentators
have questioned the constitutionality of other amendments to the surveillance statutes. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently ruled that
ECPA's "national security letter" provision violates the Constitution. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334
F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2709 is unconstitutional).
That decision is now on appeal. Privacy advocates have argued that the new roving wiretap
provision also is unconstitutional. That provision allows the government to acquire a generic
warrant that can be used to compel cooperation from any relevant communications provider.
It is asserted that such authorizations do not comply with the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that a search warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched." U.S.
Const. amend. IV; see Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Analysis Of The Provisions Of
The USA PATRIOT Act That Relate To Online Activities (Oct. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism/ 2 00 11031 eff-usa-patriot-analysis.php
(last updated Oct. 27, 2003) (arguing that "[s]uch roving wiretap authority raises serious
Fourth Amendment problems because it relaxes the 'particularity' requirements of the
Warrant Clause"). However, the government has compelling arguments that a roving
wiretap order is appropriately circumscribed when it focuses on the person utilizing the
communications device and that such an order narrowly addresses the challenge of changing
technology. See, e.g., International Terrorism: Threats and Responses: Hearing on H.R.
1710 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 250, 243 (1995) (statement of
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to allow the government to use packet sniffers is a practical one.9" Because
these devices give law enforcement access to the entire contents of a
surveillance target's Internet communications, 9' some have argued that
communications providers allowing the use of packet sniffers are providing
the government with information that goes beyond the scope of a pen/trap
order.92 This, in turn, might violate the surveillance statutes' prohibitions
on disclosing content except when the government has authorization to
obtain such material.
Some argue that packet sniffers are not materially different from
preexisting forms of surveillance and that government "minimization"
efforts are sufficient to eliminate any potential violation of the surveillance
statutes. When a traditional wiretap order is granted for incriminating
conversations over a phone line, an agent listens to at least part of every
conversation over that line, including those between the target and innocent
third parties in which no incriminating details are discussed, and engages in
minimization measures designed to reduce the privacy intrusion.93
Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice) (stating that there
is existing precedent for multipoint wiretaps and nothing about such wiretaps violates the
Constitution); id. at 281 (statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, and General Counsel, GTE Corp.) (stating that roving wiretap
authority is a constitutional response to changing technology and explaining that an
individual-and not a telephone-has a protected privacy interest). More than one court has
agreed with the government's position. See, e.g., United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that roving wiretaps satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement because they do not permit a "wide-ranging exploratory search" and there is
"virtually no possibility of abuse or mistake"); United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112,
1123-24 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the "roving intercept statute also addresses the fourth
amendment's requirement that the place to be searched be particularly described by
identifying that location in terms of where a specified individual engages in certain
conversation") (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Claimed constitutional flaws in the surveillance statutes are unlikely to pose a threat
to communications providers at this point. The safe harbor provisions probably protect
communications providers that comply with government surveillance requests even when
those requests are later ruled unconstitutional. Courts are unlikely to conclude that a
provider's compliance with existing law is unreasonable, especially in light of the risk of
contempt charges for disregarding a court order to assist with surveillance.
91. Mark Young, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert
Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1071-72 (2001) [hereinafter What
Big Eyes] (noting that "Carnivore operates in one of two modes, either 'full,' which reveals
the entire message, including both content and addressing information; or 'pen,' which
reveals just the addressing information in the electronic message.... In effect, the operation
of Carnivore in conformity with the law is entirely at the discretion of the operator, since the
operator's actions are untraceable and unaccountable").
92. See, e.g., Packet Sniffers, supra note 89, at 3.
93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000 & Supp. 2002) (providing that Title III
wiretaps "shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception"). These measures include
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But packet sniffers arguably are different, and the courts have yet to
face whether they are too different. When faced with a traditional pen/trap
order, communications providers generally have not given the government
access to the full contents of a target's phone conversations and expected it
to overlook everything but the call-routing information. Rather, they have
provided access only to "electronic or other impulses" on a phone line and
expected the government to confine its surveillance to the "dialing and
signaling information utilized in call processing."
94
In fact, permitting the use of packet sniffers may be challenged even
when the government is entitled to intercept the full content of a
surveillance target's communications. When installed on a system, packet
sniffers can analyze the communications of not just the individual target
but of every single person on a server-i.e., including those the
government has no cause to believe have information bearing on a criminal
or national security investigation. 95 As one commentator explains, when a
packet sniffer "is installed on a system, it taps everyone's e-mail on the
ISP, not just the suspect's e-mail." 96 In this way, these devices are different
from prior forms of surveillance, which generally did not require the
government to have access to every communication of all of a provider's
many customers. Giving the government access to so many innocent
subscribers' communications raises different questions than traditional
wiretaps that might incidentally capture an innocent third party's
conversation with the target of the surveillance.
contemporaneous minimization, where interception of a call is stopped after it is clear that
no evidence will be obtained. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1307-08
(1st Cir. 1987). They also include limiting interceptions of communications to times when
named targets of surveillance are on the premises where a tapped phone is located. See, e.g.,
United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1231, 1236 (1st Cir. 1995). In some cases, "after-
the-fact" minimization is permissible when an intercepted communication is in a foreign
language; officers interpreting and transcribing previously taped conversations simply stop
listening and move on after they determine that a given call is beyond the scope of the
investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1997).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2000) (containing the Pen/Trap Statute's minimization
requirements prior to 9/11).
95. See, e.g. Erich Luening, FBI Takes the Teeth out of Carnivore's Name, CNET
News.com (Feb. 9, 2001), available at http://news.com.com/FBI+takes+the+teeth+out+of+
Carnivores+name/2100-10 2 3_3-252368.html ("The investigative agency built the tool to
monitor the Internet communications of suspects under its surveillance, but the system,
housed on computers at Internet service providers, also can collect e-mail messages from
people who are not part of an FBI probe."); Robert A. Pikowsky, An Overview of the Law of
Electronic Surveillance Post September 11, 2001, 94 LAw LIBR. J. 601, 607 (2002)
[hereinafter Surveillance Overview] (noting that "[c]oncern has been raised about
[Carnivore's] capability to read all e-mail on the network without limitation to e-mail sent to
or from the target of a judicially authorized search.").
96. Government Surveillance, supra note 73, at 112-13.
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Accordingly, a communications provider permitting the government
to use packet sniffers might face suits brought by surveillance targets or
other customers contending that the routing of their communications
through a packet sniffer violated the surveillance statutes. A
communications company facing such suits should be able to rely
successfully on the safe harbor provisions, but that issue is not settled-
courts have yet to define the scope of these defenses as they apply to packet
sniffers. Thus, a plaintiff might argue that a communications provider does
not act in "good faith" when, faced with a pen/trap order, it permits the use
of a packet sniffing program. This is because, arguably, the provider would
be knowingly granting the government access to more than the noncontent
information that is responsive to a pen/trap order. Further, in permitting the
use of packet sniffers, companies are allowing the government to examine
emails exchanged between third parties not named in the surveillance
order. A plaintiff could argue that this too falls outside the coverage of the
safe harbor provisions. And even a plaintiff acknowledging that the
provider may have had a good-faith belief that its actions were lawful
might contend that this belief was not a reasonable one.97
Communications providers should, therefore, carefully consider
whether and how to permit the use of packet sniffers on their networks.
Although the task of separating content from other information about
Internet communications--or separating a surveillance target's
communications from those of other customers-is not a simple one,
companies might nonetheless choose to do so themselves rather than run
the risk of a suit premised on the government's use of a packet sniffer. And
companies electing to use packet sniffers may wish to modify their privacy
policies if they do not already provide notice that customers'
communications may be routed through such devices.98
3. Voluntary Disclosures
Another issue for communications providers is the extent to which
they should use the voluntary disclosure provisions recently added to the
surveillance statutes. In the absence of a warrant, court order, or other
document compelling cooperation, it is sometimes difficult for companies
to determine whether they are permitted to provide information to law
97. As discussed above, some courts have held that a provider must have a reasonable
good-faith belief that it acted lawfully.
98. Some commentators argue that Internet service providers have already violated their
privacy policies by allowing the use of packet sniffers on their networks. See, e.g., Laurie
Thomas Lee, The USA PATRIOT Act and Telecommunications: Privacy Under Attack, 29
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 394 (2003) [hereinafter Privacy Under Attack].
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enforcement. Some of the voluntary disclosure provisions are vague, 99
making it possible for providers unintentionally to go beyond the scope of
the exceptions. Providers that disclose too much information may face
claims that they have facilitated illegal searches when they inappropriately
rely on the voluntary disclosure provisions."° And even when the
surveillance statutes do permit disclosure, otherwise lawful voluntary
disclosures may be contrary to individual companies' privacy policies.
Thus, companies should ensure that they have updated their privacy
policies before volunteering information to the government under the new
exceptions.
Even when the surveillance statutes and company privacy policies
clearly permit a communications provider to release information
voluntarily, there may be some unwanted consequences of doing so. No
provision in the statutes entitles companies to "uninvite" the government
after an investigation has begun.1' In fact, the government may find
sufficient evidence during the voluntary phase of an investigation to return
to the communications provider armed with a court order compelling
further cooperation. Additional issues arise when the voluntary disclosure
is made pursuant to the "computer trespasser" amendment.' 02 Often, to
investigate a hacking incident fully, the government must remove the
affected server and take it to a lab for analysis.'0 3 Companies should also
weigh the possibility that, after they have invited the government to
investigate an incident, their computer equipment might be impounded,
99. For example, one exception permits disclosure of such information "as may be
necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or
property of the provider of that service." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(3) (Supp. 2002).
100. See, e.g., Surveillance Overview, supra note 95, at 617. While the safe harbor
provisions sometimes excuse improper disclosures when the provider makes a "good faith
determination" that one of the voluntary disclosure exceptions applies, the scope of the safe
harbor in such situations has not yet been conclusively resolved. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2707(e)(3) (Supp. 2002) (providing a safe harbor under ECPA for providers that make "a
good faith determination" that disclosure is permitted by one of the enumerated voluntary
exceptions); id. § 2520(d) (same under Title III). And as discussed above, some courts have
held that a provider's subjective good faith belief that its actions are lawful does not alone
immunize that provider from liability; the provider's belief must also be reasonable. See,
e.g., Freedman v. America Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 647-48 (E.D. Va. 2004).
101. Tracy Mitrano, Civil Privacy and National Security Legislation: A Three
Dimensional View, EDUCASE REV. Nov./Dec. 2002, at 53, 59 (noting that providers
making voluntary disclosures should consider what kind of control they will have to
"contour or terminate an investigation once it has begun").
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i) (Supp. 2002).
103. See, e.g., DOJ MANUAL, supra note 3, at II.B.1 .b. In fact, just recently investigators
removed a hacked computer from the George Mason campus. See Yuki Noguchi, George
Mason Officials Investigate Hacking Incident, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at EO 1, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51882005Jan 12.html.
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adversely affecting their ability to do business."° Finally, successful
hacking incidents can shake customer confidence. One expert estimates
that, by calling attention to a hacking incident, a company "will typically
lose between ten and one hundred times more money from shaken
consumer confidence than the hack attack itself represents."' 5 Given this
possibility, companies may elect to handle such incidents internally instead
of making a voluntary disclosure to law enforcement. This of course has
negative consequences for the type of information-sharing that is necessary
for the effective protection of our communications networks.
In sum, the recent amendments to the surveillance statutes have made
life more challenging for communications providers. Not only must they
deal with more and broader surveillance requests, but they must navigate a
number of complex statutory provisions that leave much room for
interpretation. Although the meaning of these amendments will likely
become clearer in time, at this point companies must work to discern how
best to act, as responsible citizens and as service providers, under the new
regime.
II. COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACT
Enacted in 1994, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act ("CALEA") does not modify or expand the scope of the
government's surveillance authority. 1°6 Instead, it requires providers of
certain communications services to design and update their networks to
facilitate lawful electronic surveillance. Congress enacted CALBA in
response to complaints from law enforcement that surveillance was
becoming increasingly difficult due to the development and proliferation of
104. At a hearing before the Senate Appropriations committee, one security expert stated
that computer hacking is often not reported because "[o]ne common fear is that a crucial
piece of equipment, like a main server, say, might be impounded for evidence by over-
zealous investigators, thereby shutting the company down." Thomas C. Greene, Dot-corn
Firms Are Hacking Each Other, THE REGISTER, Feb. 18, 2000, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/02/18/dotcom-firms-are-hackingeach/ [hereinafter
Hacking Each Other]. See also DOJ MANUAL, supra note 3, at lI.B. L.b (noting that "it may
take days or weeks to find the specific information described in the warrant").
105. Hacking Each Other, supra note 104 (summarizing congressional testimony of
security expert Mike Rasch).
106. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, "[b]ecause Congress intended CALLA to
preserve the status quo,' the Act does not alter the existing legal framework for obtaining
wiretap and pen register authorization, 'provid(ing) law enforcement no more and no less
access to information than it had in the past."' United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC
(USTA), 227 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 22
(1994)).
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new communications technologies and services.° 7  Since 9/11,
communications providers have found their duties under CALEA to be
growing, and recent developments portend of even more substantial
obligations.
A. Obligations under CALEA
CALEA imposes requirements relating to communications providers'
"capacity" and "capability" to accommodate electronic surveillance.'0 8
With respect to capability, providers must ensure that they can
expeditiously intercept wire and electronic communications carried over
their networks when those communications are subject to CALEA.' 9 They
must also be capable of giving the government access to call-identifying
information that is "reasonably available" to them." 0 Providers are charged
with supplying this information to the government in a way that protects
the privacy of communications and call-identifying information that the
government is not authorized to intercept.' Although the government
must reimburse carriers for most capability-based modifications made to
equipment, facilities, and services deployed before January 1, 1995,112
CALEA does not provide for reimbursement with respect to newer
equipment unless the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
determines that compliance with the statute is not "reasonably
107. Id. at 454. In congressional hearings, federal law enforcement officers identified
183 "specific instances in which law enforcement agencies were precluded due to
technological impediments from fully implementing authorized electronic surveillance
(wiretaps, pen registers and trap and traces)." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.103-827, pt. 1, at
14-15 (1994)).
108. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FBI (USTA 11), 276 F.3d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1) (2000).
110. Id. § 1002(a)(2). The statute does not define or interpret the term "reasonably
available." Comm. Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Servs.,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling, 19 F.C.C.R. 15,676 para. 9 n. 13
(2004) [hereinafter CALEA NPRM]. However, regulations promulgated by the FCC provide
that "[c]all identifying information is 'reasonably available' to a carrier if it is present at an
intercept access point and can be made available without the carrier being unduly burdened
with network modifications." 47 C.F.R. § 64.2202 (2002). In the context of circuit-switched
services, the FCC has defined "call-identifying information" as "dialing or signaling
information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility,
or service of a telecommunications carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (2000); 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.2202.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4) (2000).
112. Id. § 1008(a). If the government refuses to pay for such modifications, the provider
is deemed in compliance with CALEA's capability requirements. Id. § 1008(d).
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achievable.""l 3
With respect to capacity, CALEA sets up a process whereby
communications providers and law enforcement cooperate to ensure that
there will be sufficient surveillance capacity to satisfy the government's
needs.1 14 In response to FBI estimates of the capacity necessary to
accommodate upcoming surveillance requests," 5  communications
providers prepare statements of the modifications that must be made to
their systems to provide such capacity." 6 If the FBI does not agree to
provide reimbursement for the cost of installing capacity, the statute deems
providers to be in compliance with their capacity obligations even if they
fail to make the specified modifications." 17
CALEA's assistance requirements apply to any "telecommunications
carrier,""' 8 defined as any person or entity that is "engaged in the
transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a
common carrier for hire.""' 9 This category includes any provider of a
communications service that is "a replacement for a substantial portion of
the local telephone exchange service" when the FCC concludes that it is in
the public interest to classify the provider as a telecommunications carrier
for purposes of CALEA. 120 Communications providers are exempt from
CALEA's requirements "insofar as they are engaged in providing
information services,"'' which are defined as "the offering of a capability
for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications.... 1 ,22
113. Id. § 1008(b)(2).
114. See id. § 1003. A more detailed description of this process can be found in United
States Telecom Ass'n v. FBI (USTA II), 276 F.3d 620, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
115. 47 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (2000) (initial notice of estimated actual and maximum
capacity); id. § 1003(c) (notices of increased maximum capacity).
116. Id. § 1003(d).
117. Id. § 1003(e). In this way, communications providers' capacity obligations differ
from their capability obligations. As discussed, CALEA requires the government to pay for
capability-based modifications to equipment installed after January 1, 1995 only when
compliance is not "reasonably achievable." Id. § 1008(b)(2).
118. Id. § 1002(a); id. § 1003(b), (d).
119. Id. § 1001(8)(A).
120. Id. § 1001(8)(B).
121. Id. § 1001(8)(C)(i); see also id. § 1002(b)(2) (providing that the capability
requirements do not apply to "information services").
122. Id. § 1001(6)(A). That section further provides that "information services" include:
(i) a service that permits a customer to retrieve stored information from, or file
information for storage in, information storage facilities; (ii) electronic publishing;
and (iii) electronic messaging services; but... does not include any capability for
a telecommunications carrier's internal management, control, oroperation of its
telecommunications network.
Id. § 1001(6)(B)-(C).
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Communications providers that fail to meet CALEA's requirements
are subject to fines of up to $10,000 per day of noncompliance. 123 But
CALEA provides a safe harbor to communications companies if they
conform their networks to "technical requirements or standards adopted by
an industry association or standard-setting organization. .... 124 Providers
whose failure to abide by such standards precludes them from assisting the
government with lawful surveillance requests are subject to court-issued
enforcement orders. 25 Such orders, however, may be issued only when
alternative technologies or the facilities of other providers are not available
for implementing surveillance requests. 26 Further, a provider cannot be
penalized unless compliance is reasonably achievable through the use of
available technology or would have been reasonably achievable had the
provider taken timely action. 27 A number of other statutory defenses also
are available. 128
B. CALEA Issues Arising after 9/11
Congress made no meaningful changes to CALEA in response to
9/11. But a number of important regulatory developments have made life
more challenging for communications companies. Further, several earlier,
complicated issues are still under consideration.
1. Expansion of CALEA to New Services
The government has consistently argued that CALEA applies to more
than the traditional circuit-switched telephone network. In a proceeding
initiated last year, three federal law enforcement entities' 29 petitioned the
FCC 13 to conclude that CALEA requires providers of broadband access
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 2522 (c)(1) (2000) (providing for a penalty of up to $10,000 per
day of noncompliance); see also 47 U.S.C. § 1007(a) (2000) (setting forth the circumstances
under which a court may issue an enforcement order under 18 U.S.C. § 2522).
124. Id. § 1006(a)(2); United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA), 227 F.3d 450, 455
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 1007 (2000).
126. Id. § 1007(a)(1).
127. Id. § 1007(a)(2).
128. See id. § 1007(c) (stating that a provider need not meet the government's demand
for assistance if the request exceeds the level of capacity for which the government has
agreed to reimburse the provider).
129. The law enforcement agencies were the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration ("law enforcement").
130. See United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve
Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Joint Petition for Expedited Rulemaking, RM- 10865
(Mar. 10, 2004), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf=pdf&
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services"' and managed Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") services"'
to design their networks to accommodate electronic surveillance. 33 Critics
of law enforcement's position argue that these services are "information
services" outside the scope of CALEA.134
The first round in this fight went to law enforcement. 35 In a notice of
proposed rulemaking issued last August, the FCC tentatively concluded
that a number of new service providers are subject to CALEA's assistance
requirements, including "facilities-based providers of any type of
broadband Internet access service" and "'managed' Voice over Internet
Protocol" services. 136 Asserting that this should not be the FCC's final
decision on the matter, some parties have argued that the application of
CALEA to such services is inconsistent with that statute. 37 Regardless of
the ultimate resolution of this particular question, this proceeding is another
reflection of the difficult questions facing communications providers after
9/11.
id document=6516082660 [hereinafter CALEA Petition]. All public records in RM-10865
have been moved to ET Docket No. 04-295 in the FCC's electronic comment filing system.
131. The law enforcement petition defines "broadband access services" as "the platforms
currently used to achieve broadband connectivity (e.g., wireline, cable modem, wireless,
fixed wireless, satellite, and broadband access over power line) as well as any platforms that
may in the future be used to achieve broadband connectivity." CALEA NPRM, supra note
110, para. 32.
132. VolP is a means of transmitting voice communications over an IP-based network
like the Internet. The law enforcement petition defines "managed" VolP services as "those
services that offer voice communications calling capability whereby the VolP provider acts
as a mediator to manage the communication between its end points and to provide call set
up, connection, termination, and party identification features, often generating or modifying
dialing, signaling, switching, addressing or routing functions for the user." Id. para. 37.
133. CALEA Petition, supra note 130, at 15-17.
134. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve
Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association
Comments, RM-10865, at 3-4 (Apr. 12, 2004), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native-or pdf=pdf&id document=6516087738; Comm. Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Servs., Comments of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, ET Dkt. No. 04-295, at 12-15 (Nov. 8, 2004), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/
ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&id-document=6516793563.
135. CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 41 (noting that "[w]e tentatively conclude that
Congress intended the scope of CALEA's definition of 'telecommunications carrier' to be
more inclusive than that of the Communications Act").
136. Id. para. 1.
137. The comments of parties supporting and opposing the law enforcement petition can
be found under proceeding number 04-295 at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_
v2.cgi.
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2. New Standards for Broadband Technologies
After the FCC resolves the threshold question of which types of
communications services CALEA applies to, a decision will need to be
made regarding the precise nature of the CALEA obligations of the
providers that offer those services. This inquiry is far more complex in the
context of packet-switched services than it is with respect to traditional
phone service because there are many different types of broadband access
and many different forms of information involved in Internet
communications. Moreover, there are considerable technological
differences even across different providers of the same service and
different versions of the same application.
A number of communications providers are currently playing an
important role in helping to answer these questions.38 Traditional
telecommunications providers, VoIP providers, Internet service providers,
and manufacturers are negotiating with law enforcement to devise the
standards that will apply to the packet-switched technologies that the FCC
concludes are subject to CALEA. Although final standards governing
packet-based communications have not been issued, the participants have
made considerable progress. 39 For example, packet-mode standards were
recently developed for call-identifying information required in connection
with government requests for call interception for certain services such as
VolP. 4° The only thing that is clear at this point, however, is that many
communications providers are likely to be subject to stricter standards than
those they have faced in the past.
3. Deadline for Compliance
There is concern among communications providers that the FCC will
impose a deadline for CALEA compliance that leaves insufficient time for
138. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve
Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Comments of the Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions, RM-10865 (Apr. 12, 2004), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.
cgi?native-or~pdf=pdf&id-document=6516087739 (describing the status of ATIS efforts to
develop industry standards); see also id. at 2 (stating that "ATIS membership spans all
segments of the industry, including local exchange carriers, interexchange carriers,
manufacturers, competitive local exchange carriers, data local exchange carriers, wireless
providers, cellular providers, broadband providers, software developers and internet service
providers").
139. In the NPRM, the FCC describes a standard that has been approved by many
participants but "has not completed its editing and publication cycles." Id. para. 95 n.226.
140. Id. para. 94.
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completion of the industry standards process. 141 If that happens, companies
will not enjoy a safe harbor with respect to their obligations under the
statute. 42 Providers also complain that, even if there is time for the
publication of industry standards, an early compliance deadline will leave
insufficient time for manufacturers and carriers to devise solutions
consistent with those standards to bring providers into compliance with the
statute. 1
43
In the past, this issue has not alarmed providers because the FCC has
been reasonable in granting waivers of compliance deadlines. CALEA
invites petitions for extensions and provides that they should be granted if
the FCC "determines that compliance with the assistance capability
requirements under section 1002 of this title is not reasonably achievable
through application of technology available within the compliance
period."'" The FCC has generally looked with favor on such petitions.'
45
In the CALEA NPRM, however, the FCC said that extensions would be
available only in cases where the petitioning communications provider
deployed the equipment, facility, or service in question prior to October 25,
141. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve
Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Comments of Verizon on Law Enforcement's Joint
Petition for Expedited Rulemaking Concerning the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, RM-10865, at 19 (Apr. 12, 2004), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeorpdf=pdf&iddocument=6516087744 [hereinafter Verizon
Comments] (arguing that "CALEA clearly makes industry standards and safe harbors a focal
point of compliance. Much of the work that manufacturers and carriers must do to achieve
CALEA-compliance cannot begin without an industry-approved standard"); CALEA NPRM,
supra note 110, para. 142.
142. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(a)(3) (2000) (providing that "[tihe absence of technical
requirements or standards for implementing the assistance capability requirements... shall
not... relieve a carrier, manufacturer, or telecommunications support services provider of
the obligations imposed by [section 1002 or 1005] of this title, as applicable").
143. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve
Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Comments of SBC Communications, Inc. in Response
to the Commission's Public Notice Seeking Comment on the Joint Petition for Expedited
Rulemaking, RM-10865, at 13 (Apr. 12, 2004) (noting that "once a standard has been
developed, achieving the next milestone will turn on whether and how quickly
manufacturers are able to develop a solution that works with existing infrastructure"), at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-r-pdf=pdf&id-document=651608769
6; see also Verizon Comments, supra note 141, at 19-20.
144. 47 U.S.C. § 1006(c)(2) (2000).
145. As the FCC recognized in the NPRM, "[t]o date, the Commission has granted
hundreds of section 107(c) extension petitions in consultation with the FBI to permit carriers
to phase-in CALEA compliance ... The extension process has been relatively simple."
CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 89.
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1998.146 The FCC noted that this interpretation would likely preclude
extensions of deadlines for packet-mode compliance because most, if not
all, packet-based equipment, facilities, and services were installed after that
date. 47 Most carriers would, therefore, find themselves relying not on
extensions, but on the alternate relief offered in section 1008(b) of the
statute, which requires the government to pay for any modifications made
to newer equipment when a provider successfully petitions the FCC for a
determination that compliance is not "reasonably achievable."' 4 8 But the
FCC warned in the NPRM that carriers will face a very high burden to
obtain such relief and tentatively concluded that this burden "would not be
met by a petitioning carrier that merely asserted that CALEA standards had
not been developed, or that. solutions were not, readily available from
manufacturers."1 49 Noting these additional obstacles, the FCC explained
that "many carriers could find it difficult to obtain either CALEA
compliance extensions or exemptions in connection with packet
requirements. As a result, they may become immediately subject to
enforcement action."15 Because the fine for noncompliance can be as high
as $10,000 per day, it is not surprising that some communications providers
are concerned.
As discussed above, carriers can invoke a variety of defenses when
faced with an enforcement action in court. An order mandating network
changes cannot be issued unless compliance is reasonably achievable
through the use of available technology. 151 Thus, if manufacturers have not
yet developed appropriate devices to facilitate surveillance of packet-
switched communications, providers might avoid liability. Similarly,
providers are not subject to enforcement actions when the government can
obtain information from another source.' 52 A broadband provider might
argue that law enforcement should seek assistance from another provider
that is better equipped to handle a surveillance request. Relying on such
defenses, however, is clearly a second-best solution. The industry is
advocating that the FCC adopt a compliance deadline that offers
communications providers sufficient time in which to bring their systems
into compliance with CALEA's new requirements.
Whether the FCC should adopt its own enforcement mechanism is
146. Id. para. 97.
147. Id.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (2000).
149. CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 98.
150. Id. para. 99.
151. 47 U.S.C. § 1007(a)(2) (2000).
152. Id. § 1007(a)(1).
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also at issue in the ongoing rulemaking proceeding. Law enforcement
asserts that bringing a civil action in district court should not be its only
means of enforcing CALEA and argues that the FCC should establish rules
permitting the agency itself to issue notices of apparent liability.' 53 The
FCC has expressed interest in this proposal, tentatively concluding that it
"has general authority under the Communications Act to promulgate and
enforce CALEA rules." 154 The agency has called for comment on whether
it should establish a separate enforcement mechanism and, if so, what rules
should govern such a proceeding. 55 Were the FCC to adopt an independent
enforcement mechanism, it is unclear whether the statutory defenses would
be available in a proceeding before the agency.156 If stripped of those
defenses, providers could find themselves subject to even greater
obligations under CALEA.
4. Defining the Meaning of "Call-Identifying Information"
Issues regarding the definition of "call-identifying information" in
CALEA closely mirror those surrounding the meaning of "content" for
purposes of the surveillance statutes. These surfaced after the
communications industry promulgated the first round of CALEA standards
and the Department of Justice and the FBI challenged them as deficient.
5 7
In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
the FCC adopted the government's position, arguing that call-identifying
information includes-and CALEA requires communications carriers to
provide-a surveillance feature described as "[p]ost-cut-through dialed
digit extraction."' 58 That feature refers to providing access to the numbers
dialed by a surveillance target after a phone call has been connected. 59 In
addition, the FCC asserted that carriers must make available to law
enforcement noncontent information about packet-mode communications,
such as Internet communications."6 The court held that the FCC was
entitled to require communications providers to design their networks to
153. See CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 111.
154. Id. para. 114.
155. Id. para. 115.
156. See id. para. 114 (asking whether 47 U.S.C. § 1007, which contains the defenses to
a civil action under CALEA, "impose[s] any limitations on the nature of the remedy that the
Commission may impose").
157. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC (USTA), 227 F.3d 450, 455-56 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
158. Id. at 456.
159. Id. Such numbers can constitute call-identifying information when, for example, a
surveillance target uses a calling card. Id.
160. Id. at 464.
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yield different types of information about packet-mode communications. 161
And although the court held that the FCC had failed to fully explain why it
viewed post-cut-through dialed digits as "call-identifying information,"' 62
the FCC remedied this error on remand. 63
Such disputes over the meaning of "call-identifying information"
have taken on a new tenor since 9/11. First, although before 9/11
communications providers were litigating whether CALEA required them
to grant law enforcement access to post-cut-through dialed digits and
packet-mode communications, only since 9/11 have companies actually
been required to provide such information1 6' Accordingly,
communications providers are for the first time facing difficult questions
about which post-cut-through dialed digits constitute content and what
types of information in a packet constitute call-identifying information.
Designing facilities to distinguish between the two types of information has
proven far from simple. 61
Similarly, VolP was a nascent technology before 9/11. But carriers
now are squarely facing the question of how to extract call-identifying
information from a VolP packet without reading the packet's content. This
task is particularly difficult when a surveillance target's broadband service
provider is not the same company that provides the target's VolP service.
161. Id. at 465. At the same time, however, the court held that disclosure of call-
identifying information about packet-mode communications might implicate privacy
concerns. Id. at 464-65. It noted that the FCC's rules were permissible only because
"nothing in the Commission's treatment of packet-mode data requires carriers to turn over
call content to law enforcement agencies absent lawful authorization.... CALEA
authorizes neither the Commission nor the telecommunications industry to modify either the
evidentiary standards or procedural safeguards for securing legal authorization to obtain
packets from which call content has not been stripped, nor may the Commission require
carriers to provide the government with information that is not authorized to be intercepted."
Id. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court did not address whether it is
possible for communications providers themselves to successfully extract call-identifying
information from packets without violating the surveillance statutes or CALEA's privacy
provision. Id. at 464-65.
162. Id. at 462.
163. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 17,397
(2001).
164. "As of November 19, 2001," the FCC's regulations have required communications
providers to be capable of offering law enforcement "communications and call-identifying
information transported by packet-mode communications." 47 C.F.R. § 64.2203(b) (2002).
Similarly, only since June 30, 2002 have communications providers been required to
provide "dialed digit extraction," defined under the regulations as "[clapability that permits
a [law enforcement agency] to receive on the call data channel [l digits dialed by a subject
after a call is connected to another carrier's service for processing and routing." Id.
§ 64.2202 (defining "dialed digit extraction"); id. § 64.2203(c)(6) (providing timing for
provision of dialed digit extraction).
165. See CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 68.
[Vol. 57
Number 3] COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION AFTER 9/11
As the FCC has conceded, "[c]all-identifying information may be found
within several encapsulated layers of protocols," and a facilities-based
broadband service provider will not necessarily "examine or process
information in the layers used to control packet-mode services such as
VolP... ,,166 An important question now under consideration is whether a
broadband access provider should be required to supply call-identifying
information when the provider generally does not process information
found in the application level of an Internet communication. 67 Providers
have argued that they should be required to offer only the call-identifying
information that they have access to in the regular course of providing
broadband access. 168 But the FCC may conclude that law enforcement can
ask not only the application provider but also the broadband access
provider to isolate call-identifying information found in the application
layer of a packet. Broadband access providers then will face the difficult
question of how to supply this information without giving the government
access to the contents of packet-based communications.
69
Isolating call-identifying information is not without risks. CALEA
requires communications providers to protect the privacy of their
customers, 70 and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has warned that separating content from call-identifying
information in the context of Internet communications raises important
privacy issues. 7 ' Similarly, the FCC has noted that "privacy concerns
could be implicated if carriers were to give to [law enforcement agencies]
packets containing both call-identifying and call content information when
only the former was authorized."' 72 As noted, companies that unreasonably
166. Id. para. 65.
167. Id. paras. 67-68.
168. See, e.g., Comm. Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Servs., Reply Comments of the United States Internet Service Provider Association, ET Dkt.
No. 04-295, at 3 (Dec. 21, 2004), at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native.or_pdf=pdf&id-document=6516885862 (stating that "CALEA requires carriers to
provide law enforcement with access only to CII that is 'reasonably available' to the
carrier.... [Sluch information should be limited in the packet-mode context to CII that a
carrier routinely uses in delivering services to its customers.").
169. CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 65; see also United States Telecom Ass'n v.
FCC (USTA), 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This case noted the following:
Telecommunication carrier petitioners claim that packet headers (call-identifying
information) cannot be separated from packet bodies or payloads (call content).
Accordingly, they and the privacy petitioners argue that any packet-mode data
provided to a law enforcement agency pursuant to a pen register order will
inevitably include some call content, thus violating CALEA's privacy protections.
United States Telecom Ass 'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d at 464.
170. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4) (2000).
171. USTA, 227 F.3d at 464-65.
172. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Third Report and Order, 14
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misjudge the meaning of "call-identifying information" and turn over too
much information to the government also might violate the surveillance
statutes. 173 Even where a safe harbor applies, those provisions do not
protect companies from other risks, such as harm to customer relationships
brought on by a perceived failure to safeguard customer privacy. Because
policymakers have, to date, simply not addressed many of the challenges
carriers face in providing call-identifying information, communications
providers themselves must work to overcome the technological and
practical impediments to supplying call-identifying information under
CALEA.
5. Who Bears the Burden of Paying for CALEA Compliance?
Yet another important question arising under CALEA is who must
pay for the capital improvements necessary to bring carriers into
compliance with the statute. As the FCC has recognized, "[tihe
modifications and upgrades required ... will potentially require significant
capital expenditures on the part of carriers."' 74 Although CALEA requires
the government to reimburse carriers for most modifications made to
equipment, facilities, and services deployed before January 1, 1995,171 it
does not require reimbursement for improvements made to newer
equipment unless compliance with the statute is not "reasonably
achievable."' 76 What is meant by this term-and, accordingly, who pays
for network enhancements-is particularly important to Internet service
providers and VoIP providers, which often do not have the capital
necessary to comply with their new CALEA obligations.
This issue is more pressing after 9/11. The law enforcement petition
F.C.C.R. 16,794, para. 48 (1999).
173. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. As discussed, however, the government does
engage in minimization efforts designed to protect the privacy of communications that it is
not authorized to intercept. See supra note 93.
174. CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 117. One commenter noted:
[C]ompanies must often establish separate departments, solely devoted to
processing and responding to government requests. The large telephone
companies and Internet service providers, for example, have entire staffs of clerks,
attorneys, and former law enforcement agents (often as large as 30-50 employees)
just to handle government subpoenas and court orders.
Stewart A. Baker, The Regulation of Disclosure of Information Held by Private Parties, in
PROTECTING AMERICA'S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE: A REPORT OF THE MARKLE
FOUNDATION TASK FORCE 161, 171 (Markle Foundation, 2002), available at
http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/MarkleFull-Report.pdf.
175. 47 U.S.C. § 1008(a) (Supp. 2002). If the government refuses to pay for such
modifications, the provider is deemed in compliance with CALEA's capability
requirements. Id. § 1008(d).
176. Id. § 1008(b)(2).
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urges the FCC to establish new rules requiring that "'carriers bear the sole
financial responsibility for development and implementation of CALEA for
post January 1, 1995 communications equipment, facilities, and services,"'
despite the complaints of providers that the cost of such modifications is
exceedingly high.' 77 Basically, law enforcement asks the FCC to eliminate
the cost of a proposed modification as a factor in its analysis of whether
that modification is "reasonably achievable" and argues that providers
should be able to recover those costs from their customers.1 78 Further, law
enforcement has called into question communications providers' ability to
recoup their capital expenditures through provisions in the surveillance
statutes that require the government to pay for the cost of surveillance
activities.179 In their petition, the law enforcement entities argue that those
provisions permit carriers to recoup only the incremental costs of providing
surveillance, asserting that "permitting carriers to include their CALEA
implementation costs in their administrative intercept provisioning costs
would not only violate Title III... but would also make it increasingly
cost-prohibitive for [law enforcement agencies] to conduct intercepts."'' 80 If
the FCC resolves this question in favor of law enforcement, it could mean
hundreds of millions of dollars in additional costs for communications
companies. 181
In short, questions remain to be answered with respect to CALEA.
The FCC appears poised to expand the reach of the statute to include at
least some packet-switched communications. And companies might face a
number of costly burdens, including an expedited deadline to bring their
networks into compliance with the statute at their own expense.
177. CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, paras. 119-20.
178. See id. para. 123.
179. Such provisions include, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 2706(a), which states the
following:
[A] governmental entity obtaining the contents of communications, records, or
other information under section 2702, 2703, or 2704 of this title shall pay to the
person or entity assembling or providing such information a fee for
reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and which have been
directly incurred in searching for, assembling, reproducing, or otherwise providing
such information.
18 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2000).
180. CALEA NPRM, supra note 110, para. 119; see also id. para. 132.
181. See id. para. 117 (noting that, although there are no "solid" estimates of the cost of
updating facilities deployed after 1995, the government nearly has exhausted a $500 million
fund that Congress appropriated for modifications to pre-1995 facilities).
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III. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION
Critical infrastructure has been defined as "systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity
or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or
any combination of those matters." 18 2 Government agencies and members
of Congress have long maintained that the federal government and the
private sector should cooperate in identifying vulnerabilities of, and
potential threats to, the nation's critical infrastructure. Since 9/11, calls for
such cooperation have intensified, prompting legislative and regulatory
changes designed to encourage companies to share their critical
infrastructure information with the government. Despite these changes,
communications providers must consider the risks in disclosing sensitive
critical infrastructure information.
A. Critical Infrastructure Initiatives
Even before 9/11, there was a push for the federal government to
acquire information about the nation's critical infrastructure and for the
government and the private sector to cooperate in ensuring the security of
our national infrastructure, 85 percent of which'83 is privately owned. In
1996, President Clinton established the Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection ("CCIP").'84 CCIP was charged with "assessing
the vulnerabilities of the country's critical infrastructures and proposing a
strategy for protecting them."'185 It issued a final report in 1997 proclaiming
that "two-way sharing [of] information is indispensable to infrastructure
assurance" and that "increasing the sharing of strategic information within
each infrastructure, across different sectors, and between sectors and the
government will greatly assist efforts of owners and operators to identify
their vulnerabilities and acquire tools needed for protection."'186 CCIP
182. Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8083 (Feb. 20,
2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.2); 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (Supp. 2002).
183. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 398 (2004), available at http://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/report/
index.htm [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
184. Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 15, 1996).
185. JOHN D. MOTEFF & GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (Report
for Congress, 2003), at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31547.pdf [hereinafter MOTEFF &
STEVENS].
186. Id. (quoting Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures. The Report
of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Oct. 1997)). One of the
Authors, Jamie S. Gorelick, was co-chair (with former Senator Sam Nunn) of the Advisory
Committee to the Commission.
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proposed, for each industry sector, the creation of an Information Sharing
and Analysis Center ("ISAC") where private sector representatives and the
government would cooperate to compile critical infrastructure information,
analyze it, and identify potential vulnerabilities. 117 In response to CCIP's
proposal, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive No.
63. I88 It required some key government officials to consult with private
sector owners and operators of critical infrastructures to establish these
private sector, information-sharing centers and encouraged the creation of
the information analysis center proposed by CCIP. 189
After 9/11, the focus on compiling and analyzing critical
infrastructure information became far sharper. In October 2001, President
Bush issued an Executive Order on Critical Infrastructure, which
established a senior executive branch board to coordinate federal critical
infrastructure efforts. 9 ' The President's Critical Infrastructure Protection
Board was charged with engaging the cooperation of state and local
governments and the private sector. 91 Shortly thereafter, as part of the
Patriot Act, Congress enacted the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of
2001.192 It provides that "a public-private partnership involving corporate
and non-governmental organizations" should work to ensure that "any
physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the critical infrastructures
of the United States be rare, brief, geographically limited in effect,
manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy, human and
government services, and national security of the United States."'1 93 It also
establishes a National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
responsible for, among other things, acquiring data from the private sector
and using it to create and maintain models of critical infrastructure
systems. 194
Even under these post-9/11 enactments, government efforts to acquire
such information have been only marginally successful. In part, this is
because companies are hesitant to provide information when the
government requests it. Companies have been concerned that information
in the government's possession might be subject to public disclosure under
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id. (citing The White House, Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures:
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (May 1998), available at http://www.ciao.gov/resource/
paper598.pdf).
189. Id.
190. Exec. Order 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,063 (Oct. 16, 2001).
191. Id. § 5(a)-(c), 66 Fed. Reg. 53,064-65.
192. Patriot Act § 1016 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c (Supp. 2002)).
193. Id. § 1016(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(c)).
194. Id. § 1016(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(d)).
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the Freedom of Information Act, which provides a mechanism for
interested parties to force the government to release certain types of
information. 195 And communications providers wish to avoid government
disclosure of critical infrastructure information to third parties lest their
competitors obtain their valuable proprietary information.1 96 Companies
also worry that the sharing of certain information might make them
vulnerable to antitrust actions or expose them to other forms of liability.1
97
Moreover, companies are concerned that they might undermine the
market's confidence in their services by highlighting their systems'
vulnerabilities. 19
8
To encourage the sharing of information about critical infrastructure,
Congress passed the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 as part
of the Homeland Security Act. " In a section entitled "Protection of
Voluntarily Shared Critical Infrastructure Information," the Act provides
that critical infrastructure information "voluntarily submitted to a covered
Federal agency for use by that agency regarding the security of critical
infrastructure and protected systems, analysis, warning, interdependency
study, recovery, reconstitution or other informational purpose" is exempt
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. 2' The Act also
contains a number of other prohibitions on the use and disclosure of such
195. Some companies worried that their sensitive information might be subject to
disclosure even though the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") contains exemptions that
arguably covered critical infrastructure information. See Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment,
The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/ll: Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical
Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261, 290-91 & n. 162
(2003) [hereinafter FOIA Post-9/11] (citing industry concerns that sensitive information
would be disclosed by the government under FOIA); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(providing a FOIA exemption for "trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential"). As discussed below, a new FOIA
exemption for critical infrastructure information disclosed voluntarily to the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") now gives communications providers more assurance that their
sensitive information will not be made publicly available. See infra text accompanying note
200.
196. See FOIA Post-9/11, supra note 195, at 289; MOTEFF & STEVENS, supra note 185, at
15.
197. See FOIA Post-9/11, supra note 195, at 289-90; MOTEFF & STEVENS, supra note
185, at 15.
198. MOTEFF & STEVENS, supra note 185, at 2, 15.
199. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
200. 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1) (Supp. II 2003). It is important to note that the only "covered
Federal agency" is the Department of Homeland Security. Id. § 131(2). The new FOIA
exemption does not protect information submitted to other government entities. Further,
critical infrastructure information does not qualify for the new exemption unless it is marked
with the statement, "This information is voluntarily submitted to the Federal Government in
expectation of protection from disclosure as provided by the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002." Id. § 133(a)(2).
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data.20 ' Any federal employee who unlawfully uses or discloses critical
infrastructure information is subject to firing, fines, and imprisonment for
up to a year.20 2 Under this statute, therefore, a communications company
can provide infrastructure information to the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") with some assurance that the secrecy of that information
will be preserved.
Additional critical infrastructure provisions appear in the recently
passed Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. One
requires the DHS to prepare a report to Congress regarding critical
infrastructure, including the status of the Department's efforts to complete
vulnerability and risk assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure. 23
Another requires the Department to coordinate industry efforts to identify
private sector resources and capabilities that could supplement government
efforts to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack.2' The purpose of these
legislative developments is that companies' infrastructures may enjoy
increased protection from terrorist and hacker attacks, but companies are
also likely to face an increased expectation that they will share critical
infrastructure information.
B. Factors to Consider When Disclosing Information
There is no simple guide to how companies should handle
governmental requests for information on infrastructure vulnerabilities.
Communications providers are eager to do what they can to help safeguard
the nation's critical infrastructure against acts of terrorism and computer
crime. And companies enjoy a number of benefits when they share critical
infrastructure information. However, because such sharing is voluntary,
they therefore weigh a number of factors when determining how much
201. Id. § 133(a)(I)(A)-(F). For example, disclosures about critical infrastructure
information are not subject to judicial or agency rules regarding the ex parte disclosure of
information to government officials. Id. § 133(a)(l)(B); Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8088 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.8(h)).
Similarly, no government or private entity may use voluntarily disclosed critical
infrastructure information in any civil action. 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(C); Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. at 8074, 8088 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. § 29.8(i)).
202. 6 U.S.C. § 133(f) (providing that a federal employee who unlawfully discloses
critical infrastructure information "shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than I
year, or both, and shall be removed from office or employment"); Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8089 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. § 29.9(d) (same)).
203. Intelligence Reform Act § 7306(b)(1).
204. Id. § 7402.
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information to offer.2°5
Communications companies derive important benefits from sharing
critical infrastructure information. Because computer attacks are rarely
confined to one provider's system, sharing information with the
government and with other providers permits communications companies
to better understand the nature of attacks on their networks. Such
information sharing equips providers to protect their systems more
effectively against future attacks. It also helps providers to identify other
weaknesses in their networks and to devise potential remedies. And the
reputations of companies are enhanced-both with government officials
and with the public generally-by cooperating with government efforts to
protect the nation's critical infrastructure against attack.
But other factors may act as counterweights. The government may
release critical infrastructure information in a number of circumstances. z°
Providers also have no private right of action against those who release
information in violation of the Homeland Security Act and must rely on
other mechanisms for redressing unlawful disclosures of their
205. One commentator notes that, after considering some of these factors, critical
infrastructure operators might continue to withhold information from the government
despite the FOIA exemption. See FOJA Post-9/ll, supra note 195, at 282.
206. The Homeland Security Act permits the DHS to disclose sensitive critical
infrastructure information to designated parties in several situations. For example,
information can be released to state and local governments. Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8087 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.8(b)).
And there is no clear enforcement mechanism through which these governments can be
punished if they disclose information in violation of the statute; the Act's penalty provision
applies only to "officer[s] or employee[s] of the United States or of any department or
agency thereof." 6 U.S.C. § 133(f) (Supp. II 2003); Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8089 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.9(d)).
It is also permissible for the DHS to disclose a company's critical infrastructure information
to foreign governments in certain circumstances. Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8088 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.80)).
Further, critical infrastructure information may be released to government contractors,
which are barred from disclosing the information to others but are not subject to the Act's
penalties of imprisonment or fines if they do. Compare id. at 8087 (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. § 29.8(c)) (requiring federal contractors to sign corporate or individual
confidentiality agreements and providing a general prohibition on disclosure), with 6 U.S.C.
§ 133(f) (Supp. II 2003) (providing that a federal employee who unlawfully discloses
critical infrastructure information "shallbe fined under [T]itle 18 .... imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both, and shall be removed from office or employment"), and Protected
Critical Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8089 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified
at 6 C.F.R. § 29.9(d) (same)). Finally, critical infrastructure information is subject to the
Whistleblower Protection Act, and may be disclosed to the public when it evidences a
violation of the law, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety. Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8088 (Feb.
20, 2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.8(f)(3)).
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information.2 °7
A second factor is the affirmation requirement set out in the
regulations implementing the Critical Infrastructure Information Act.
Persons and companies submitting critical infrastructure information must
also affirm their understanding that any false representations may constitute
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and be punishable by a fine or
imprisonment.2 °s That statutory provision provides for harsh penalties for
those who make false statements to the government or who conceal a
material fact.2°
Third, companies must be careful not to release more information to
the government than is permitted. Privacy laws might bar the disclosure of
some types of information. Contracts with other companies might bar the
unilateral disclosure of infrastructure information when it constitutes
proprietary information. 1 °
After weighing these considerations, communications companies
should put in place policies and procedures for responding to government
inquiries regarding critical infrastructure. Some companies have decided
that the risks of liability and public disclosure are simply too great,
prompting them to decline to disclose any information. Other companies
are sharing such information with each other and/or the government.
Companies that elect to share information should take care in drafting their
disclosure policies with respect to different types of information and ensure
that their privacy notices to customers are consistent with their disclosures.
Finally, companies should be aware that the DHS's critical
infrastructure disclosure protections are under pressure. Since the passage
of the Homeland Security Act, a number of parties have supported
legislation to reduce protections for critical infrastructure information. 211
207. 6 U.S.C. § 134 (Supp. 2002); Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed.
Reg. 8074, 8084 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.3(e)).
208. Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8085 (Feb. 20,
2004) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. § 29.5(e)).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). The statute applies to one who "knowingly and
willfully--(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material
fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry." Id. § 1001 (a).
210. Cf. MOTEFF & STEVENS, supra note 185, at 2 (explaining that companies have been
hesitant to share information because doing so might expose them to liability in the event
that the government discloses confidential business information).
211. Groups that have expressed concern with the FOIA exemption for critical
infrastructure information include the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Natural Resources Defense Fund, the Society of Professional
Journalists, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group. Id. at 15 n.49. Bills to limit the
protections of the Homeland Security Act have been introduced, including the Restoration
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Moreover, given the recent passage of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, agency proceedings will likely be underway
soon to draft regulations implementing the Act.2 12 Companies should keep
abreast of any new developments in this area and participate in agency
proceedings when necessary to protect their interests.
One industry spokesman has argued that "information sharing is a
risky proposition with less than clear benefits. ' ' t 3 Communications
providers do face risks when sharing critical infrastructure information. But
they also derive important benefits from such sharing, including a better
understanding of how to address vulnerabilities in their networks. Thus,
neither complete secrecy nor full disclosure is a viable course of action.
IV. APPROVAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN U.S.
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES
When a foreign entity seeks to acquire control of a U.S. business, the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS")-
comprising a dozen U.S. government departments and agencies-may
review the proposed transaction to ensure that it will not threaten the
national security of the United States. If CFIUS investigates and
recommends against the transaction, the President can block the transaction
or order divestment. Relatedly, when a foreign entity seeks to acquire
control of a U.S. communications company, the parties often must seek
authorization from the FCC, and the FCC will not grant that authorization
until U.S. law enforcement and security agencies (members of CFIUS)
signify their acquiescence in the deal's closing.
Since 9/11, it has become more difficult for foreign entities to obtain
approval for their acquisitions of communications companies. Recent
developments suggest that there now are greater obstacles to cross-border
investment in such companies and other entities with advanced
technologies. Even when a company with substantial foreign ownership
of Freedom of Information Act of 2003, which was pending in both the House and Senate in
2003. The Restoration of Freedom of Information Act of 2003, S. 609, H.R. 2526, 108th
Cong. (2003). See Ava Barbour, Ready... Aim... FOIA! A Survey of the Freedom of
Information Act in the Post-9111 United States, 13 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 203, 225 (2004)
(discussing this legislation).
212. As discussed above, the Intelligence Reform Act requires the Department of
Homeland Security to issue a report regarding critical infrastructure and to coordinate
efforts to identify private-sector resources that could aid the government in preventing or
responding to a terrorist attack. See supra text accompanying notes 203 and 204.
213. FOIA Post-9/1l, supra note 195, at 289 (quoting Securing Our Infrastructure:
Private/Public Information Sharing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 107th Cong. 97-98 (2002) (statement of Harris N. Miller, President, Information
Technology Association of America)).
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obtains CFIUS approval of a transfer of control, the interested agencies in
CFIUS often condition their approvals on the company's consent to and
ongoing compliance with particular requirements or safeguards. To be sure,
the agencies may be willing to tailor those conditions to some degree in
light of the company's demonstrated business needs.
A. CFIUS Review Process
The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of
19502'14 gives the President power to suspend or prohibit a foreign interest's
acquisition of control over a U.S. business when "[t]here is credible
evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest
exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national
security. ' '211 The President's authority to proscribe transactions is
extremely broad and is not subject to judicial review.216
The President has directed CFIUS to assist in the exercise of this
authority. 217 CFIUS investigates transactions and makes recommendations
to the President. Chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, the committee is
made up of members from a wide range of government agencies, including
the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. 21 8
Exon-Florio does not require the parties to a transaction involving a
foreign entity's assumption of control to file a CFIUS notification. Any
such filing is voluntary. But if a notice is not filed, the President may, even
after the deal has closed, order divestment. 219 Because there is no statute of
214. Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1425 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170).
215. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(1); 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(b)(1) (2002).
216. Id. § 800.601(b).
217. Exec. Order 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988).
218. Before 9/11, CFIUS had eleven members: (1) the Secretary of the Treasury; (2) the
Secretary of State; (3) the Secretary of Commerce; (4) the Secretary of Defense; (5) the
Attorney General, representing the Department of Justice (including the FBI); (6) the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; (7) the U.S. Trade Representative; (8) the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget; (9) the Director of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy; (10) the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; and (11)
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. David A. Menard. The
Flexibility of Exon-Florio Amendment and the Expansion of Telecommunications Into the
Global Economy, 31 PUB. CONT. L. J. 313, 315 (2002).
219. 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(c)(2) (2002); id. § 800.401(b) (providing that CFIUS can
trigger review of a transaction upon written notice to the parties to the transaction). See also
Eric Simonson, Specialized Areas of Concern in Acquisition Transactions, in A GUIDE TO
MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS 2005, at 317, 346 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. 1461, 2005) [hereinafter Areas of Concern] (noting that "[w]hile there
is no absolute rule requiring that the parties to a transaction provide such notice, the failure
to do so means that CFIUS may commence an investigation at any time").
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limitations on CFIUS review, the unwinding of a transaction can be
ordered years after it has been completed.22° By contrast, when parties to a
transaction file a voluntary notification, they enjoy a "safe harbor" if their
transaction survives CFIUS review.221 After the committee concludes that
an investigation is not warranted or the President declines to prohibit a
transaction, that decision cannot be revisited at a later date.222
When parties decide to seek the CFIUS safe harbor, they initiate
CFIUS review by filing a "voluntary notice." '223 CFIUS then has thirty days
in which to decide whether to investigate the transaction.224 If CFIUS
decides to investigate, it must conclude that investigation within forty-five
days and then make a recommendation to the President whether to permit
the transaction to proceed. 225 The President must act on CFIUS's
recommendation within fifteen days.226 If CFIUS or the President fails to
take a required action within any of these statutory deadlines, the
government may not thereafter block the transaction or require divestiture
under Exon-Florio.
227
If any of the agencies represented on the committee has concerns
228Intecus ofti
about the transaction, negotiations may ensue. In the course of this
220. 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d) (2002); European Commission, 2004 Report on United
States Barriers to Trade and Investment, at 62 (2004), available at http://trade-
info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/march/tradoc_121929.pdf [hereinafter European
Commission].
221. See Christopher R. Fenton, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-
September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 195, 209-10 (2002) [hereinafter Transnational Security].
222. 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d)(2)-(3) (2002). There is an exception to this rule for
circumstances where a party has submitted false or misleading information to CFIUS. Id.
§ 800.601(e).
223. Id, § 800.401(a). An investigation can also begin at the request of a CFIUS member.
Id. § 800.401(b).
224. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a); 31 C.F.R. § 800.404(a) (2002); id. § 800.502(a); id.
§ 800.503(a).
225. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a); 31 C.F.R. § 800.504(a) (2002).
226. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d); 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(a) (2002).
227. The government retains any other authority to challenge the transaction, such as
pursuant to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(i) (providing
that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to alter or affect any existing power,
process, regulation, investigation, enforcement measure, or review provided by any other
provision of law"); 31 C.F.R. § 800.102 (2002) (providing that "[n]othing in this part shall
be construed to alter or affect any existing power, process, regulation, investigation,
enforcement measure, or review provided by any other provision of law").
228. See Kathleen A. Lacey et al., International Telecommunications Mergers: U.S.
National Security Threats Inherent in Foreign Government Ownership of Controlling
Interests, 4 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PRop. 29, 49-50 (2002) [hereinafter International
Mergers] (describing negotiations preceding CFIUS's approval of a foreign acquisition of a
U.S. communications company).
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process, companies often are required to agree to conditions sought by
CFIUS members. Agreements arrived at through this process then become
mandatory conditions to CFIUS approval.229
B. FCC Approval of License Transfers
A foreign entity seeking to acquire a U.S. communications company
holding FCC licenses must secure the approval of not only CFIUS but also
the FCC. 230 If the executive branch-i.e., CFIUS or its members-informs
the FCC that consummation of the transaction would raise national security
concerns, the FCC will defer acting on the parties' application for transfer
of control until the executive branch agencies confirm that the parties have
agreed to take satisfactory steps to address those concerns.23' In practice,
this means that the parties to the transaction must negotiate an agreement
concerning security issues with the interested agencies, usually the
Department of Justice, the FBI, and the DHS, and sometimes the
Department of Defense. After the parties have submitted the executed
agreement to the FCC, the FCC will (if all other requirements have been
satisfied) give its consent to the transfer of control. The FCC also will
condition its consent, and the new licensee's continued right to operate
under the license, on the licensee's compliance with all of its obligations in
the agreement with the executive branch agencies.
C. CFIUS and FCC Approval after 9/11
CFIUS and FCC approval requirements posed hurdles before 9/11 for
foreign entities' acquisition of control of U.S. communications companies.
Since 9/11, it has become more difficult for foreign businesses to make
such purchases. To secure approval, foreign businesses may have to accept
more conditions than in the past.
Part of the heightened challenge can be traced to an attitudinal change
on the part of those who review transactions. CFIUS is triggered by
transactions that may implicate "national security." Neither the Exon-Florio
Amendment nor its implementing regulations define the meaning of this
pivotal term.232 And since 9/11 the types of transactions viewed as raising
229. See Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on
Technology Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L. 441, 498
(2003) [hereinafter Wall Still Stands].
230. 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 310(b) (2000).
231. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications
Market, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891, paras. 59-62
(1997).
232. Instead, "the definition of 'national security,' and what constitutes a threat, turns on
the broad discretion of the administration in power." Transnational Security, supra note
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national security concerns have expanded.233 Transactions that once might
easily have passed muster at CFIUS are now being scrutinized more
carefully. This is particularly true of foreign acquisitions of companies
possessing telecommunications, computer, and Internet related assets.234
Former government officials involved in CFIUS reviews have said that,
since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, "the administration has stressed its
concern about the potential vulnerability of the U.S. telecommunications
infrastructure. 235  Noting such developments, the European
Telecommunications Network Operators' Association ("ETNO") (the
association of incumbent wireline operators in Europe) has asserted that
"the current climate may encourage wide interpretation of the scope of
Exon Florio, allowing censoring [of] a wide variety of business
combinations under the guise of national security." 236 A similar claim has
been made with respect to FCC approval, too. The European Commission
has said:
[T]he impact of the events of 11 September has been felt in the
telecoms sector as US law enforcement agencies.., have imposed
strict corporate governance requirements on companies seeking FCC
approval of the foreign takeover of a US communications firm in the
form of Network Security Arrangements going further than before.237
One source of the change for companies seeking CFIUS approval is
the executive order issued by President Bush in February 2003 making the
Secretary of Homeland Security a member of CFIUS. 238 This addition
increases the number of security-minded representatives on the committee
and makes it potentially more difficult to obtain CFIUS approval. Former
senior government officials who served on the committee have noted that
the installation of the Secretary of Homeland Security dilutes the influence
221, at 198. However, CFIUS has noted that "transactions that involve products, services,
and technologies that are important to U.S. national defense requirements will usually be
deemed significant with respect to national security." Regulations Pertaining to Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,774, 58,775 (Nov. 21,
1991).
233. Otis Bilodeau, Security Hawks Gain Voice in Foreign Deals, LEGAL TIMES, Apr.
28, 2003, at I [hereinafter Bilodeau] (noting that there has been a "broadening of what
constitutes a national security concern"); Wall Still Stands, supra note 229, at 498 ("The
scope of transactions deemed potentially harmful to national security has been expanding.").
234. Wall Still Stands, supra note 229, at 498.
235. Bilodeau, supra note 233, at 19.
236. European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association, ETNO Reflection
Document in Response to DG External Relations' Consultation "Strengthening the EU-US
Economic Partnership", at 1 (2004) [hereinafter ETNO]; see also id. at 3 (noting that, "[i]n
the wake of the 1 th of September 200[1] the concerns behind the law have been amplified
considerably").
237. European Commission, supra note 220, at 73.
238. Exec. Order 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,631 (Feb. 28, 2003).
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of those in favor of international investment.239
As a result of these changes, communications companies have found
it more difficult to obtain approval for their transactions. For example,
Hutchison Whampoa was blocked when it tried to acquire a share of
bankrupt Global Crossing. 240 Hutchison had partnered with Singapore
Technologies Telemedia ("STT"), a company owned in part by the
government of Singapore. From the start, CFIUS expressed concern about
Hutchison's possible ties to the Chinese government.241 Both Hutchison
and STT proposed a series of safeguards in an attempt to meet the
committee's concerns: to place Global Crossing's U.S. assets within a
"secure" U.S. subsidiary staffed and operated by U.S. citizens;242 and when
that failed, to limit Hutchison to the role of a passive investor.243 Under the
latter plan, four U.S. citizens would control Hutchison's ownership interest
and sit on Global Crossing's ten-member board. 24 This did not satisfy
CFIUS, which announced that it would undertake an investigation of the
proposed transaction. At that point, Hutchison withdrew from the
transaction. STT took over Hutchison's portion of the deal and submitted a
new notice to CFIUS. 245 Eventually, the transaction was approved in
September of 2003.
Even though it secured CFIUS approval, STT was required to agree to
a number of conditions. 246 This is not unusual. ETNO has said:
strict minimum requirements for any future acquisition will include
extensive oversight by the US Government of key operations of the
purchasing entity; strict visitation and communications policies for
foreign nationals; stringent corporate governance requirements (such
as the appointment of Security Directors and a Security Committee);
appointment of a third party auditor; and increased screening of
sensitive personnel (such as citizenship and security clearances for key
239. Bilodeau, supra note 233, at 1.
240. This proposed deal raised a number of eyebrows because Global Crossing operated
an extensive fiber-optic network that the U.S. government used for some of its
communications. Stephen Labaton, Pentagon Advisor is Also Advising Global Crossing,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at Cl.
241. Drew Cullen, China Fears Shatter Hutch Global Crossing Bid, THE REGISTER, May
1, 2003, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/20O3/05/Ol/china-fearsshatterhutch_
global/ [hereinafter China Fears].
242. Bilodeau, supra note 233, at 19.
243. Id.
244. Id. Hutchison and STT proposed that those four positions be filled with very
prominent Americans, including former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and outgoing
Merrill Lynch Chairman David Komansky. Id.
245. See China Fears, supra note 241.
246. Press Release, Global Crossing, Global Crossing Receives CFIUS Approval for ST
Telemedia Investment (Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.globalcrossing.com/xml
news/2003/september/19.xml.
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persons).247
In addition, the government has sought to raise the bar still more for
foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies. One recent proposal by the
Department of Defense would have made it mandatory for companies to
file CFIUS notices in most cases.248 .Although that proposal was shelved,249
other legislative and regulatory efforts to strengthen the CFIUS and FCC
review processes will continue. 50
D. Considerations When Seeking Approval
Although CFIUS review has become more difficult since 9/11,
foreign groups still can acquire U.S. communications companies. By
anticipating the challenges that they will face, foreign companies can
substantially reduce the risk that CFIUS will trump their cross-border
initiatives.
As discussed, CFIUS appears more inclined to find that, at least at
first blush, foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies may present national
security concerns. While this perception may tempt non-U.S. companies to
try to avoid CFIUS scrutiny by not filing voluntary notifications, that tactic
cannot succeed in the case of acquisitions of many communications
companies. Whether or not a foreign business files with CFIUS, it must file
applications for transfer of control of FCC licenses, and that necessarily
means that the agencies in CFHUS will become aware of the proposed
transaction. The FCC then will not approve the transfer until the executive
branch participants sign off. Thus, the better course is for the purchaser to
deal with CFIUS from the outset, including submitting a voluntary notice at
the appropriate time and negotiating an agreement that meets CFIUS's
concerns.
247. ETNO, supra note 236, at 3.
248. See Peter Spiegel, Pentagon Retracts Plan for Review of Mergers, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at 10 [hereinafter Spiegel]; ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, PROHIBITIONS TO CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS: DOD PROPOSAL TO MAKE
EXON-FLORIO MANDATORY, available at http://www.ofii.org/issues/background/
background-probhib.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter ORGANIZATION FOR
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT].
249. See Spiegel, supra note 248; ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT,
supra note 248.
250. See ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, supra note 248 (noting that
the "DOD reportedly has not given up on the measure or its interest in compulsory filings. It
is our understanding that the proposal may resurface as congressional legislation"); see
Transnational Security, supra note 221, at 232 (noting that "immense public and
Congressional pressure to eliminate the security gaps that contributed to the United States'
present state of vulnerability could translate into legislative insistence on a greater executive
role").
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Participants in certain types of transactions should take particular care
in navigating the CFIUS approval process. The most obvious is when the
acquiring company is owned or controlled by a foreign government. 25 ' Law
enforcement and intelligence officials assert that control over U.S.
communications facilities gives foreign governments too much knowledge
about U.S. surveillance targets and techniques. 252 And control over key
infrastructure could empower a hostile foreign government to shut down
portions of the U.S. communications system. 253 Exon-Florio was amended
to require a 45-day CFIUS investigation of any transaction implicating
national security where a foreign government acquires a U.S. company.
25 4
And Hutchison's attempted purchase of a share in Global Crossing
suggests that acquisitions involving foreign governments will now be
viewed with a heightened level of scrutiny.255
CFIUS also takes a greater interest when the acquired company
handles sensitive communications, including military or government
communications. 256 The concern is that the foreign purchaser will be in a
position to offer sensitive information to foreign governments or other
parties.2 57 The United States also is very protective of its cutting-edge
251. See generally International Mergers, supra note 228 (describing the special
concerns raised when foreign governments seek control over U.S. communications
companies).
252. See id. at 35. The International Mergers Article explains:
Ownership and control of U.S. communications networks gives a foreign
government the capacity to gain access to confidential information about the
targets of U.S. national security and law enforcement investigations, the nature of
those investigations, and the sources and methods used, as well as information
about the extent to which the U.S. government is aware of foreign governments'
intelligence activities.
Id. See also id. at 49-50 (noting that approval of a recent transaction was only offered after
the acquiring company agreed to ensure that there would be no foreign government
involvement in wiretapping over the company's facilities).
253. Id. at 36-37.
254. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b); see Transnational Security, supra note 221, at 206-08
(describing the history of the amendment); see also id. at 207-08 (noting that such
transactions must be reviewed when they "could affect" national security, while the general
standard refers only to transactions that "threaten[] to impair the national security").
255. See International Mergers, supra note 228, at 48-56 (describing recent examples
where foreign government control of the acquiring company was a significant hurdle to
CFIUS approval).
256. Areas of Concern, supra note 219, at 351-52, 347.
257. See Transnational Security, supra note 221, at 236 (noting that "control over
telecommunications and information technologies" could permit foreign entities to use such
infrastructure "for the purpose of espionage [and] could lead to foreign access of classified
government information that could hinder American military and diplomatic efforts");
International Mergers, supra note 228, at 36 (noting that "there are concerns that foreigners
could use control of phone networks in the United States to conduct surreptitious electronic
surveillance on business conversations and to steal trade secrets, or that foreign companies
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technology. CFIUS looks carefully at transactions that might undermine the
technological advantages of U.S. companies.2 8 There also is a growing
desire that foreign companies not be in a position to transfer state-of-the-art
technology to a foreign government or an undesirable third party. 259
Companies aware that their acquisitions are likely to arouse the
interest of CFIUS can take a number of steps to minimize the burdensome
requirements imposed as conditions to the approval of their transactions.
Some difficulties can be avoided if attention is paid to the way in which a
transaction is structured. 260 For example, ensuring that U.S. persons remain
in key management positions after the transfer of control can help address
some concerns.
Companies also can minimize the difficulty of obtaining approval by
anticipating the concessions that they will be required to make and
including such features in their transactions from the outset. It seems clear
that a transaction will not be approved unless law enforcement has
assurance that foreign control of a company will not inhibit its ability to use
that company's facilities for surveillance.26' Similarly, communications of
U.S. persons may be routed overseas by foreign entities only in limited
circumstances. 262 When such details are discussed early, there will likely be
fewer roadblocks to approval.
Special issues arise when the company to be acquired possesses
security clearances. 263 Although CFIUS may choose not to block such
transactions, the acquired company may be stripped of its clearances 264
might work on behalf of their own countries' intelligence services, using U.S.
telecommunication devices to funnel information back to their home country").
258. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(0(5) (directing the President to consider "the potential
effects of the proposed or pending transaction on United States international technological
leadership in areas affecting United States national security"); see Transnational Security,
supra note 221, at 234 (speculating that "CHUS would be inclined to review, and perhaps
restructure, the acquisition of a company that produces any of a number of new
technologies").
259. See Transnational Security, supra note 221, at 215, 243-46.
260. Id. at 213 n.92 (noting that "[r]estructuring could also be initiated by the foreign
company in anticipation of government disapproval").
261. International Mergers, supra note 228, at 35.
262. Id. at 35-36 & n.33 (noting that the FBI often fears that it will lose the ability to
enforce surveillance orders "when entire or significant components of the communications
systems operating in the United States are located outside our borders" and that,
accordingly, the FBI insists on essential facilities and data being located within the United
States).
263. Areas of Concern, supra note 219, at 351-52.
264. In those instances where a company is determined to be under "foreign ownership,
control, or influence," as defined by the Department of Defense, the company is ineligible
for a security clearance and its existing clearances may be revoked. Id. at 352.
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unless safeguards for the protected information are put in place.2 65 For
example, foreign persons should not be placed in key management
positions or on the company's board of directors.266 Similar issues arise
when the acquired company possesses certain types of export licenses.267
In sum, while CFIUS was becoming more visible in the years prior to
9/11, it now plays a lead role in regulatory clearances for foreign
acquisitions of communications companies. Foreign entities seeking to deal
successfully with CFIUS need to plan in advance and anticipate CFIUS's
concerns. Companies contemplating a transaction that could trigger CFIUS
review do well, first, to consider the changes that the post-9/1 1
environment has wrought in this interagency process and, second, begin the
necessary consultations very early to address any national security concerns
that CFIUS might have.
V. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND EXPORT CONTROLS
For decades, the United States has maintained extensive controls on
the export and reexport of sensitive goods and technologies. The U.S.
government also has imposed economic sanctions against designated
countries and persons based on foreign policy and national security
considerations. Since 9/11, the government has stepped up its enforcement
activity against companies and individuals who violate these controls and
sanctions. The export control regulations are complex and can present
difficult compliance responsibilities.
A. Taxonomy of Export Control Rules
The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") administers and enforces U.S. economic sanctions.268 OFAC
265. See id. at 352-53 (noting that, "[b]y carefully structuring a transaction and the
operations of the acquired business going forward, it is sometimes possible to obtain or
maintain security clearances notwithstanding modest amounts of foreign ownership of a
parent company").
266. See id. at 352.
267. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c)(4) (requiring parties filing CFIUS notices to state
whether the company to be acquired produces technical data or products subject to certain
export controls). See also 22 C.F.R. § 122.4(b) (requiring companies that export certain
defense articles to notify the Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls at least
60 days before a transfer of ownership or control to a foreign person).
268. OFAC regulations apply to "United States persons," i.e., all companies organized in
the United States, including the overseas branches of those companies; all U.S. citizens or
permanent residents located anywhere in the world; and all individuals, entities, and
property located in the United States. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 560.314 (2002). U.S. economic
sanctions imposed against Cuba and North Korea also apply to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies. See, e.g., id. § 515.329. No U.S. person may "approve, finance, facilitate, or
guarantee any transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person
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sanctions prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with
designated countries such as Cuba, Iran, and Sudan. 269 They also restrict
dealings with designated entities and persons. These "Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons" include terrorists, proliferators of weapons
of mass destruction, drug traffickers, traders of "conflict diamonds," and
others acting as agents of designated countries.27° The scope of OFAC
sanctions varies according to the target. For example, Cuba is subject to
embargoes on almost all imports, exports, reexports, travel, investments,
and other financial dealings.27' By contrast, Myanmar is subject to
restrictions on certain types of new investments.272
The Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security
("BIS") administers the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR"),
which control exports and reexports of certain "dual use" (i.e., items
suitable for both commercial and military applications) goods, software, or
technology. 273 Various factors affect the application of EAR controls. 274
These include the nature of the item at issue and its classification under the
EAR.275 Another key factor is the ultimate destination of any applicable
shipment;276 there are restricted destinations and embargoed countries to
which no exports may be made without a prior license.277 In addition, the
end-use or end-user of the product implicates possible licensing
requirements. 278 For example, some shipments of technology that could
have missile applications are proscribed because they involve a restricted
would be prohibited.., if performed by a United States person or within the United States."
Id. § 560.208.
269. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2002) (Cuba); id. pt. 560 (Iran); id. pt. 538 (Sudan).
270. See, e.g., id. pt. 597 (foreign terrorist organizations); id. pt. 594 (global terrorism
sanctions); id. pt. 596 (terrorism list governments); id. pt. 539 (weapons of mass
destruction); pt. 536 (drug traffickers); id. pt. 598 (narcotics kingpins); id. pt. 591 (traders of
conflict diamonds). The names of persons and organizations on these lists are published in
the Federal Register and are available on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List (Mar. 3, 2005), available on the OFAC website at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/index.html.
271. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2002) (prohibited transactions); id. § 515.204
(imports); id. § 515.205 (blocked accounts); id. § 515.560 (travel restrictions).
272. See, e.g., id. § 537.201 (new investments); id. § 537.404 (purchases of shares in
development projects).
273. 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2002). The Export Administration Regulations can be found in
15 C.F.R. pts. 730-744. Unlike the OFAC rules, the jurisdiction of the EAR is not limited
by the nationality of the person engaged in export activity. Rather, the rules cover the export
or reexport of any item "subject to the EAR," as defined in 15 C.F.R. § 734.3.
274. Id. § 732.1.
275. Id. § 732.1(b)(1), (c).
276. Id. § 723.1(b)(2).
277. See id. pt. 738, Supp. 1 (containing chart highlighting problem countries).
278. See id. § 732.1(b)(3)-(4).
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end-use; 279 in other cases, otherwise permissible exports are prohibited
under the EAR because they are destined for use by a particular party.28 °
The BIS regulations also control the release or disclosure of
technology28' or software source code to foreign nationals located
anywhere in the world, including foreign employees of U.S. companies in
the United States.282 When technology or software is released to a foreign
national who is not a permanent resident of the United States or a
"protected individual" under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 283
that release is treated as an export to the national's home country under the
"deemed export" rule.284
The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls ("DDTC") of the U.S.
Department of State administers the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations ("ITAR"). 285 These regulations control exports, reexports,
retransfers, and temporary imports of "defense articles" and "defense
services," which are items on the U.S. Munitions Lists or goods and
technologies specially designed or modified for military applications.286
Like the EAR, the ITAR also have provisions governing deemed exports to
foreign nationals.287
B. The Evolution of Economic Sanctions and Export Control Rules
after 9/11
The Patriot Act and other post-9/l1 legislation did not make
significant changes to statutes authorizing the economic sanctions and
export control regime. Nevertheless, recent developments present difficult
compliance issues and impose new responsibilities.
279. See, e.g., id. § 744.3 (restrictions on missile end-uses).
280. See, e.g., id. § 744.13 (exports to specially designated terrorists).
281. Technology is defined extremely broadly, to include such things as "instruction,
skills training, working knowledge, [and] consulting services." See id. § 772.1.
282. "Export" is defined to include the "release of technology or software subject to the
EAR to a foreign national in the United States." Id. § 734.2(b)(1). See Gregory W. Bowman,
E-mails, Servers, and Software: U.S. Export Controls for the Modern Era, 35 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 319, 339 (2004) [hereinafter Modem Era].
283. The Immigration and Naturalization Act defines a "protected individual" as a
citizen, national, lawful temporary resident, or person granted asylum or refugee status. 8
U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3) (Supp. 2002).
284. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii) (2002).
285. See Joseph J. Dyer, Export Control: A Visa May Not Be Enough, MD. BAR J., Mar.-
Apr. 2004, at 36 [hereinafter Visa Not Enough].
286. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2002).
287. Id. § 120.17(a)(4) (providing that the term "export" includes "[d]isclosing
(including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign person,
whether in the United States or abroad").
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Although the number of countries subject to restrictions has
declined,288 there has been a significant increase in the number of entities
and persons who appear on U.S. government lists of parties subject to
economic sanctions and export controls. 289 Not surprisingly, these
expanding lists include government-identified sponsors of terrorism and
persons and organizations furthering the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.29
Transactions subject to EAR licensing requirements also have been
affected post-9/1 1. BIS has become increasingly concerned about the
export of sophisticated communications equipment, software, and
technology. As a result, it tends to scrutinize license requests more closely
and to impose more conditions on authorizations that are granted. 291 These
conditions mean that companies must extend their compliance
responsibilities beyond the point of export from the United States to factors
relating to known ultimate uses of the item that is shipped.
In addition, there is an increased expectation that companies engaged
in international transactions will implement internal screening procedures
in their business operations to ensure compliance with OFAC sanctions.
292
This often includes the use of software to scan and interdict transactions
involving prohibited end-users or sanctions targets on government watch
lists. 293 For the most part, these programs help companies meet heightened
288. The United States has eased sanctions against Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the UNITA faction in Angola, and the countries that
were once part of Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Exec. Order 13,357, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,665 (Sept. 20,
2004) (lifting sanctions against Libya); Exec. Order 13,324, 69 Fed. Reg. 2823 (Jan. 15,
2004) (lifting sanctions against Liberia and Sierra Leone).
289. See Modem Era, supra note 282, at 344, 357; Philip K. Ankel & Glenn H.
Kaminsky, Exporting to Special Destinations and Persons: Terrorist-Supporting and
Embargoed Countries, Designated Terrorists and Sanctioned Persons, in COPING WITH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 2004, at 175, 181 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. 3160, 2004) [hereinafter Exporting to Special Destinations].
290. See Exporting to Special Destinations, supra note 289, at 18 1. Continually updated
lists of Specially Designated Global Terrorists ("SDGTs"), Foreign Terrorist Organizations
("FTOs"), and Specially Designated Terrorists ("SDTs") subject to OFAC prohibitions can
be found at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sanctions/t1 lter.pdf (last visited Apr.
17, 2005).
291. See generally 15 C.F.R. pt. 744 (2002).
292. See, e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Foreign Assets Control Regulations for
the Financial Community, at Part V, available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/regulations/facbk.txt (last visited Apr. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Foreign Assets Control]
(discussing importance of internal compliance programs for financial institutions).
293. See, e.g., Berne C. Kluber, Global Distributions: The Effect of Export Controls, 23
Hous. J. INT'L L. 429, 452 (2001) ("Faced with the prospect of searching through a series of
long, complex lists in different formats, many companies use interdiction software to help
them screen customers and transactions.").
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standards of care. However, increased screening also presents many
burdens, such as undertaking additional due diligence to rule out uncertain
screening results and "false positives." Although such procedures help
mitigate civil penalties for failure to comply with sanctions, they do not
immunize companies from liability.294 Significant fines have also been
imposed on companies that have implemented screening programs but
nonetheless failed to uncover impermissible transactions.295
"Knowledge" standards and requirements also present compliance
issues. Companies face legal liability if they "knowingly" export a
commodity subject to the EAR to an end-user or for an end-use that is
unauthorized. 296 The BIS may find "knowledge" for these purposes if a
"red flag" should have alerted the exporter of a likely violation.297
Examples of "red flags" include evidence that (1) "[t]he customer is willing
to pay cash for a very expensive item when the terms of the sale call for
financing"; (2) "[t]he shipping route is abnormal for the product and
destination"; and (3) "[r]outine installation, training or maintenance
services are declined by the customer.- 298 But these examples are neither
exhaustive nor necessarily applicable to certain transactions, and exporters
bear the burden of determining whether a transaction violates the EAR. 299
The knowledge standard is ambiguous in certain respects, and might soon
be revised.3"
Finally, federal agencies will take enforcement action against
companies for export violations committed by the companies they acquire,
even when those violations predate the merger or acquisition. °1 A $1.76
294. See Foreign Assets Control, supra note 292, at Part IV.
295. See, e.g., OFAC Civil Penalties Enforcement Information for January 07, 2005,
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/civpen/penalties/01072005.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2005) (detailing recent sanctions actions taken against a number of
companies with screening programs in place).
296. 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(5) (2002); see also Wall Still Stands, supra note 229, at 492
(noting that "technology transfers that would not normally require export licensing could
require a license because of the nature of the end-use or end-user").
297. These "red flag" indicators are published at 15 C.F.R. pt. 732, Supp. 3. They can be
found at http://www.bis.doc.gov/Enforcement/redflags.htm.
298. 15 C.F.R. pt. 732, Supp. 3 (2002).
299. Modern Era, supra note 282, at 343; see also 15 C.F.R. pt. 732, Supp. 3 (providing
that "Commerce has developed lists of such red flags that are not all-inclusive but are
intended to illustrate the types of circumstances that should cause reasonable suspicion that
a transaction will violate the EAR").
300. The BIS is currently engaged in a proceeding aimed at further refining the
knowledge standard. See Revised "Knowledge" Definition, Revision of "Red Flags"
Guidance, and Safe Harbor, 69 Fed. Reg. 60,829 (proposed Oct. 13, 2004) (to be codified at
15 C.F.R. pts. 732, 736, 740, 744, 752, 764, 772).
301. Traditionally, successor liability was not believed to attach for export control
violations. See, e.g., BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR
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million fine was levied against Sigma-Aldrich Corporation for export
violations committed by a firm that the company purchased.3 2 Similarly,
Boeing Satellite Systems, Inc. was required to pay $32 million to settle
charges brought against it for the acts of a company that it acquired.30 3
C. Ways To Minimize Potential Liability
Keeping up with complicated export rules and constantly changing
government lists of sanctioned persons and prohibited end-users is
challenging even for the most sophisticated of companies. °4 And the
penalties for violating the rules are severe, including criminal prosecution,
large monetary penalties, and loss of export privileges.30 5 Companies
exporting goods and technologies should design and implement
comprehensive compliance policies and establish mechanisms for updating
those policies as the rules change.3" Given the complexity of the rules, this
is no easy task.
As part of that undertaking, companies should develop effective
2003, Statement of the Secretary and Under Secretary, available at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/News/2004/03AnnualRept/#Letter (noting that a BIS enforcement
case in 2003 "made new law" by "establish[ing] the precedent of successor liability for
violations of the Export Administration Regulations").
302. BIS's decision is available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/Enforcement/CaseSummaries/
SigmaAldrichALDecision02.pdf. Research Biochemicals Limited Partnership, the
company that Sigma Aldrich acquired, allegedly made illegal exports of biological toxins.
Id.
303. Hughes, Boeing Pay $32M to Settle Charges Of Sensitive Technology Transfers to
China, 79 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) No. 10, 281, 303 (Mar. 11, 2003). Kenneth Juster, Under
Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, has stated that "corporations will be held
accountable for violations of U.S. export control laws committed by companies that they
acquire." Press Release, Bureau of Industry and Security, Sigma-Aldrich Pays $1.76 Million
Penalty to Settle Charges of Illegal Exports of Biological Toxins (Nov. 4, 2002), at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/News/2002/SigmaAldrichPays4Acquisition.htm [hereinafter
Sigma-Aldrich Press Release].
304. Nathan T.H. Lloyd, Rebuilding a Broken Regime: Restructuring the Export
Administration Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 299 (2004) [hereinafter Broken
Regime] (complaining in the abstract that "a multitude of statutes and regulations govern
dual-use technology transfers, forming a bureaucracy that is impossible to adhere to for the
private sector ... ").
305. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 501.701 (2004) (OFAC criminal and civil penalties); 15
C.F.R. § 764.3(b)(2) (2002) (BIS criminal penalties, civil penalties, and denial of export
privileges).
306. In addition to helping companies comply with the export control rules, such policies
are essential in the event that a company violates those rules. The federal sentencing
guidelines provide that the existence of a compliance program is a mitigating factor in
assigning the penalty for a violation. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (Nov. 1, 2004). See also Wall Still Stands, supra note 229, at 515
("Should a violation occur, existence of a compliance program should serve as a mitigating
factor in an investigation.").
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screening policies to identify suspect transactions.3" Difficult issues often
arise in identifying and resolving "false positives." Further, internal
screening measures should be continually updated because the government
lists can frequently change.
Communications companies with export licenses conditioned on the
end use or end user of the export can gain some measure of protection by
acquiring an "end-user certificate" from the buyer stating that the product
will not be used in a prohibited way.3"8 As noted, exporters also should pay
close attention to possible "red flags" that a product may be destined for a
prohibited end-use or end-user.3°9
Due to the growing number of foreign nationals employed by U.S.
companies in the technology sector, one of the most difficult issues for
many communications providers is dealing with the "deemed export" rule.
To avoid violations, companies must determine whether any of their
products or services are subject to EAR or ITAR licensing requirements
and, if so, the citizenship and visa status of each foreign person who has
access to those products or services. In doing this, companies should be
mindful of employment discrimination laws, which prohibit discrimination
on the basis of national origin or citizenship status. 310 One solution is for
companies to obtain BIS or DDTC licenses for those employees who are
likely to require access to sensitive technologies. 311 However, obtaining
such licenses may be time-consuming, and maintaining compliance with
such authorizations can be difficult. 312
Communications providers can also take steps to reduce or eliminate
307. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 732, Supp. 3. The Code specifically states:
Employees need to know how to handle 'red flags'. Knowledge possessed by an
employee of a company can be imputed to a firm so as to make it liable for a
violation. This makes it important for firms to establish clear policies and
effective compliance procedures to ensure that such knowledge about transactions
can be evaluated by responsible senior officials.
308. Broken Regime, supra note 304, at 315.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Cynthia J. Lange & Richard J. Pettler, Recruiting Workers Post 9-11: How
to Avoid Immigration Discrimination While Considering Export Control Concerns, in 35TH
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE, at 95, 98 (PLI Corporate Law and
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1340, 2002) [hereinafter Immigration
Discrimination].
311. Visa Not Enough, supra note 285, at 36.
312. See, e.g., Immigration Discrimination, supra note 310, at 101 (noting that,
"[d]epending on the nature of controls, nationality of the foreign national, and other
applicable licensing policies, the adjudication process may take 2 to 18 months"); Wall Still
Stands, supra note 229, at 528 (noting that "[w]hen deemed-export licenses are issued, they
often are subject to conditions, such as restrictions on the foreign national's access to high-
performance computers, advanced microprocessors, or certain semiconductor production
equipment").
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the possibility that they will be subject to successor liability for the prior
misdeeds of the companies they acquire. Providers embarking on mergers
or acquisitions should perform an export control compliance review as part
of the due diligence work conducted prior to the transaction. This may
permit them to identify potential liabilities and more accurately price the
company they seek to acquire. Such a review might also reveal the need to
add export-control-related indemnification provisions to transaction
agreements. As one senior BIS official has noted, "when acquiring another
firm, a company should scrutinize the export control practices of the
acquired company in order to avoid the risk of incurring substantial liability
along with the assets of the company."3 3
Finally, communications companies can protect their interests by
keeping abreast of developments affecting export controls. As part of the
war on terrorism, there are frequent proposals for new legislation and
regulations to tighten existing economic sanctions and export controls and
to limit the extent to which U.S. companies may communicate with their
foreign subsidiaries.314 For example, Senator Lautenberg recently proposed
an amendment to the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization bill315 that
would have prohibited foreign subsidiaries or affiliates of U.S. companies
from engaging in transactions with countries on the State Department's
terrorism watch list.316 Similarly, Senators Grassley and Baucus requested
in February 2004 that OFAC provide further guidance as to the scope of
permissible dealings between U.S. parent companies and their foreign
subsidiaries.317
313. Sigma-Aldrich Press Release, supra note 303, (quoting Michael J. Garcia, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement).
314. One commentator notes that "the events of and following September 11, 2001 ...
[have] led some observers to conclude that U.S. commercial export controls need to be
strengthened, not eased, in light of the threat of terrorism and weapons proliferation."
Modem Era, supra note 282, at 325.
315. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, S. 2229, 108th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2004).
316. Discussion of the amendment can be found at 150 CONG. REC. S5729, S5768,
S5777 (daily ed. May 19, 2004). The amendment was narrowly defeated in a 50-49 vote.
Id. at S5785.
317. Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Baucus Seek Answers on U.S.
Companies' Dealings With Countries Named as Terrorism Supporters (Feb. 19, 2004),
available at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2004/p04rO2-19.htm.
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VI. INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT
OF 2004
The recently passed Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 ("Intelligence Reform Act")3"' contains provisions that may
give rise to new burdens on and opportunities for communications
providers.31 9 Several sections of the Act require the DHS to consult with
communications providers. One requires the Department to coordinate
industry efforts to identify private sector resources that could help the
government prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. 320 Another encourages
the Department to promote adoption of voluntary national preparedness
standards for the private sector.32' A third requires the Department, in
consultation with the FCC and communications providers, to study the
feasibility and desirability of an emergency alert system designed to issue
telephonic warnings in the event of a terrorist attack.322 These provisions
place obligations only on the DHS. But they are likely to give rise to
government information requests and new consultations.
The Act contains two other provisions that also should be of interest
to communications providers. Both sections address communications
interoperability. The first directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the FCC, to "establish a program to enhance public safety
interoperable communications at all levels of government.-32 3 It requires
establishment of a comprehensive national approach to achieving
interoperable communications for public safety providers,324 and it directs
the Secretary to accelerate development of voluntary national consensus
318. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified at scattered sections U.S.C.).
319. In addition to the provisions discussed below, the Intelligence Reform Act contains
sections addressing critical infrastructure information and the government's surveillance
authority. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform Act § 7306 (requiring the Department of Homeland
Security to issue a report on threats to the nation's critical infrastructure). See id. § 6001(providing for FISA surveillance of "lone wolf' terrorists); discussion supra Part I and Part
III.
320. Intelligence Reform Act, § 7402(3).
321. Id. § 7305(b).
322. Id. § 7403.
323. Id. § 7303(a)(1). The Intelligence Reform Act provides:
"[I]nteroperable communications" means the ability of emergency response
providers and relevant ... government agencies to communicate with each other
as necessary, through a dedicated public safety network utilizing information
technology systems and radio communications systems, and to exchange voice,
data, or video with one another on demand, in real time....
Id. § 7303(g)(1).
324. Id. § 7303(a)(1)(A).
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standards for such communications.325 It also encourages the development
and implementation of flexible and open architectures aimed at providing
solutions to public safety communications interoperability. 26 Finally, it
requires the establishment of mechanisms for coordinating communications
interoperability in high-risk urban areas327 and cross-border interoperability
between the United States and other countries. 328 The second provision
directs the Secretary, in consultation with the FCC, to assess strategies for
meeting public safety telecommunications needs.329 It provides that the
Secretary shall consider "the need and efficacy of deploying nationwide
interoperable communications networks" and "technical and operational
standards and protocols for nationwide interoperable broadband mobile
communications networks ..."330
The development of standards-particularly if the standards are used
to guide grant-making and other spending-will cause migration to fewer
systems, particularly in the communications equipment used by public
safety personnel. Suppliers of such systems will need to engage with the
DHS on this process. Though the contemplated standards are voluntary, the
studies mandated by these provisions could lead to required technological
or equipment standards. The Act also provides a source of funding for state
and local governments seeking to upgrade their existing communications
systems, raising the specter of those entities reducing their purchases from
private communications providers and competing with those providers.
331
Of course, these sections also present an opportunity for some
communications companies. The Act directs that interoperable emergency
communications systems be deployed as soon as possible for use by first
responders.3 32 Communications providers that win contracts to design,
install, and offer service over these systems may benefit from business
relationships with a wide range of government entities. And, as the 9/11
Commission noted, the nation's security is enhanced if first responders can
325. Id. § 7303(a)(1)(D).
326. Id. § 7303(a)(1)(E).
327. Id. § 7303(d) (requiring the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the FCC, to support the rapid establishment of effective interoperable communications
capabilities in the event of an emergency in urban areas where the risk of a terrorist attack is
high).
328. Id. § 7303(c) (requiring the President to establish a mechanism to coordinate cross-
border interoperability issues between the United States and Canada and between the United
States and Mexico).
329. Id. § 7502(b).
330. Id. § 7502(b)(1).
331. Id. § 7303(e).
332. Id. § 7303(i)(2).
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better communicate with one another.333
VII. CONCLUSION
If one theme connects these areas of heightened governmental interest
and strengthened governmental power, it is that the communications
infrastructure in the hands of the private sector is critically important to the
public safety of the people of the United States. In the aftermath of 9/11,
the government sought to ensure that its investigators would get the
information that they need and that our communications pathways would
remain available to us and free from malicious interference. These efforts
have presented new and very difficult challenges to the companies that
control this infrastructure. By identifying and remaining conscious of those
challenges-both to the interests of the shareholders and to the privacy
rights of consumers and citizens-industry participants can better acquit
their multiple responsibilities and, where necessary, help the government
adjust its own approach to these difficult and important efforts.
333. See 9/11 Commission Report, supra note 183, at 396-97.
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